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 Present-day Okinawa has been a prefecture of Japan since the final decades 
of the nineteenth century, but the central fact is that Okinawa’s antecedent, Ryukyu, 
had been an independent kingdom before its annexation by Meiji Japan in 1879. The 
kingdom engaged in a highly sophisticated network of diplomatic and trade relations 
with different polities, and centuries of cosmopolitan influences come to represent a 
mixture of ethnicities, cultures, and histories. 
 Ryukyu first established a tributary relationship with China during the Ming, 
characterized by ceremonial vassalage and gift exchanges. This marked Ryukyu’s 
entry into the “Chinese world order”, whose operational part was constituted by the 
tributary system. Ryukyu’s relations with Ming China in the form of distinguishable 
Chinese and other cultural influences remain as a source of contemporary Okinawan 
identity that marks differences from mainland Japan. It is thus misleading to conflate 
Ryukyu’s distinct trajectory to Japanese history. Ryukyu’s distinctiveness has allowed 
Okinawan ethnic consciousness to remain palpable to the present. 
 The need to reexamine Ryukyu’s role and place in the long trajectory of East 
Asian history and divorce it from the master narrative of Japanese homogeneity is a 
major impetus for the dissertation. The point of departure is the period 1372-1526, 
from the founding of Ming-Ryukyu formal relations to the end of “the Great Days of 
Chuzan”. I consider Ryukyu during this period from these vantage points: what roles 
were played by the early kings? What was the outcome of the expansion of royal 
involvement into cultural and economic issues ranging from diplomacy to trade and 
religion? How should we assess the kingdom’s tributary relationship with the Ming 
apart from the conventional wisdom of “tribute for trade”? 
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 My main thesis is that early Ryukyuan kings were wholly aware of how their 
relationship with the Ming emperor could contribute to their performance as a ruler. 
I study the kings’ practices and self-representations as complex cultural and political 
acts of promulgating messages and words in a material and visual manner, through 
the media of culture, investitures, and tablets. The engagement in all things Chinese 
was inseparable from their exercise of kingship. Far from the received wisdom that 
tribute was an act of submission for trade, such arrangements reflect the Ryukyuan 
kings’ determination to harness investitures and trade to the work of the Shuri-Naha 
enterprise—the rule of culture and ritual. Recognizing this function of tribute for the 
kingdom substantially subverts the myth of “tribute for trade”, and I contend for a 
reinterpretation of the “Chinese world order” as a ritual order. 
 Chapter 1 discusses the “Chinese world order” by recounting the debate on 
the tributary system. Chapters 2 and 3 point to how and why Ryukyuan kings made 
political use of Ming items and investitures to build positive feelings in their subjects 
and tie them to the Shuri centre. Chapter 4 engages the categorization of the East 
Asian region and how it can be a powerful means of legitimating identity. Chapter 5 
explores the issue of the “politics of memory” in which history defines indigenous 
peoples and hence legitimizes their political agenda against that of other parties. It is 








A Note on Romanization 
 In China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the family name precedes 
the given, and this order has been followed throughout the thesis. The order also 
applies to the Chinese, Japanese, and Okinawan authors whose works appear in 
translation or who publish in the English medium with their family names last in the 
Western sequence. The Romanization of Chinese words follows the Pinyin system of 
phonetic transcription with the exception of Taiwanese names of authors and 
publishers, which follow the Wade-Giles Romanization instead. The Romanization of 
Japanese names follows the Hepburn system. Macrons to indicate long vowels in 
names have been used except in reference to personal names, places, and well-
known terms. All Romanizations of names and titles published in English have been 
retained. All English translations of original texts, unless otherwise indicated, are my 
own renditions. 
 The Romanization of Chinese words follows the Japanese pronunciation if 
the original Chinese text is published in either Japan or Okinawa, one example of 
which is Chen Kan’s Shi Ryukyu roku instead of Shi Liuqiu lu in the pinyin format. In 
such cases, the location of the publisher takes precedence. 
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1. The Ming Tributary System in Regional Context 
 
The “Chinese World Order” in retrospect 
Chinese emperors, each an incarnation as the “Son of Heaven”, always claimed 
to rule “all under heaven”, referring to the known world of the Chinese. This imagined 
geography tended the Chinese towards perceiving the world in a set of assumptions and 
principles that were analogous to the ones that governed the internal state and 
society.1 Fashioned in the Confucian ideal, the Chinese state and society emphasized 
hierarchy and non-egalitarianism. The Chinese perception of the world, coined the 
“Chinese world order”, saw China as the centre of the world, the “Middle Kingdom”, 
yielding expression to its relations with the “Others” by situating it as the core from 
which culture, morals, civilization and all other positive attributes were emanated to the 
peripheral “barbaric” regions, endowing the Chinese emperor with a civilizing mission. 
Power radiated from the Chinese emperor and indeed from the throne itself, in a series 
of concentric circles to indefinable distant regions. Conceived as finite, power became 
highly personalized, resulting in a series of patron-client relationships.2
                                                            
1 The “Chinese world order” was an expression of the same principles that governed the social 
and political order within the Chinese state and society. See John K. Fairbank, “A Preliminary 
Framework”, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John K. 
Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 2. See also Chen Shangsheng 陈尚胜, 
“Zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi chuyi” 中国传统对外关系刍议, Historical Research in 
Anhui, 1 (2008): 16-25; Tanigawa Michio谷川道雄, Zui to ̄sekai teikoku no keisei隋唐世界帝国
の形成 (The Formation of the Sui-Tang World Empire) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2008). 
 
2 In the words of one scholar, “China acted as the passive guarantor of a matrix of unequal but 
autonomous relationships rather than as an active metropolitan power”. See Brantly Womack, 
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 Imperial China interacted with its tributaries in an arrangement combining both 
ceremonial vassalage and gift exchanges. It was reciprocal on the assumption that non-
Chinese rulers would submit to the Chinese emperor, who would in turn reward displays 
of compliance and loyalty with benevolence, usually in the form of lavish gifts and trade 
concessions either at the frontiers or in the port cities. Therefore, the tributary system 
unequivocally had an economic dimension as well.3
We owe much of our knowledge of the “Chinese world order" and the Chinese 
tributary system to John K. Fairbank, who has written articles and compiled the first 
seminal volume on the subject in 1968. He offers a preliminary framework with which 
we can easily locate and identify the order and system in Chinese history.
 
4
                                                                                                                                                                  
China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 
135. 
 However, in 
an apparent bid to rationalize Chinese war defeats and failure at self-strengthening 
attempts, Fairbank misses the point that the order did evolve with the system, and such 
dynamism was made possible by the generally flexible and pragmatic approach of the 
Chinese dynasties in pertinence to their foreign relations with the non-Chinese. In fact, 
the Chinese often had to reconcile dissonances between theory and fact, and defiance 
or open conflict was common in their world order. 
3 Hamashita Takeshi浜下武志 interprets the tributary system as a form of trade and attaches 
importance to regional economic integration. Hamashita Takeshi, Cho ̄ kō shisutemu to kindai Ajia
朝貢システムと近代アジア (The Tributary System and Modern Asia) (Tokyo: Tokyo University 
Press, 1990). 
4 Fairbank argues that the “Chinese world order” was a unified concept only at the normative 
level, and only at the Chinese end, and that Qing China failed to offer an appropriate “response 
to the West” with regard to its foreign relations because it was too caught up in the Confucian 
mystique of rule-by-virtue. The Fairbankian paradigm remains in force to date, finding popularity 
with many non-Western scholars as well. See Nishijima Sadao西嶋定生, Higashi Ajia sekai to 
sakuho ̄ taisei東アジア世界と冊封体制 (The East Asian World and the Investiture System) 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002). Nishijima identifies it as the “investiture system” in place of the 
“tributary system”. See also Han Sheng 韩昇, Dongya shijie xingcheng shilun 东亚世界形成史论 
(Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2009). 
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The attempt to rectify Fairbank’s model is seen in the conference volume China 
among Equals. The volume indicates that the Chinese dynasties had not conducted the 
same system on a uniform set of assumptions and rules for two millennia. 5 The 
flexibility to reflect reality and use different languages and ways in managing foreign 
relations suggests that the world order and its auxiliary tributary system were never 
static, rigid, and monolithic. Chinese court officials, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
possessed vast knowledge of non-Chinese entities and were not contemptuous of the 
latter, having been realistic in their attitudes towards foreign lands.6
In sum, imperial China enrolled tributaries primarily to enhance its emperor’s 
prestige as a universal ruler. For the Chinese, it was a given, not something that had to 
be proven or tested. They aimed to convey this message to other peoples or polities to 
establish the institution appropriate to China’s status as “all under heaven”. As such, the 
“Chinese world order” was neither objective nor a timeless reality, but a socio-political 
construct in the name of culture. The analysis and concern of scholarship on the subject 
have also changed with the times. In the past, the most fundamental question arising 
from the subject was why late imperial China had failed to offer a positive response to 
the Western impact, with the analytical lens being the foreign relations of China. The 
analytical lens remains much the same, but the focus has shifted to understanding the 
attitude and behaviour of contemporary China in its foreign affairs and explicating the 
kind of influence that the “Chinese world order” and tributary system might have borne 
 
                                                            
5 See China among Equals, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). The 
volume has proven that the Chinese court could be interested in maritime trade and fostering 
relations with other polities. 
6 This was particularly so in the Song, when the Chinese state recognized its military weakness 
and ritual hierarchy was transformed into diplomatic parity. See Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of 
a Lesser Empire”, in China among Equals, pp. 47-65. See also Tao Jing-shen, Two Sons of Heaven: 
Studies in Sung-Liao Relations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), for works on Song 
China’s relations with Liao 辽, Jin 金, and Western Xia 西夏. 
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on it. Such emphasis at the political level suggests that the subject has not yet fallen into 
oblivion and is now endowed with a new lease of activity with the boom and emergence 
of China as an important actor on the global arena.7
Under the rubric of “China’s Response to the West”,
 The renewed interest in the subject 
assumes that China’s cultural inheritance continues to shape its contemporary foreign 
relations. Why would Chinese imperial courts and their tributaries bother enacting and 
participating in the elaborate tribute system? Why is the bygone “Chinese world order” 
still of relevance in our contemporary world? 
8
However, the works of Paul A. Cohen and G. William Skinner are beginning to 
render this rubric obsolete, when they discover a China rich in internal developments.
 imperial China had been 
stagnant in its development until the West offered the impetus to thrust it to modernity 
at great Chinese resistance. In this rhetoric the Chinese were backward and held fast to 
an entrenched form of Confucian culturalism counter to the Western, “relatively more 
progressive” industrialization and nationalism. Apologists for Western imperialism have 
deemed positive and revolutionary the Western impact on China, attempting to explain 
why China had failed to progress like the West did and qualifying the continued Western 
involvement and American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
9
                                                            
7 Recent works on the “Chinese world order” include Billy K. L. So, John Fitzgerald, Huang Jianli, 
James K. Chin, eds., Power and Identity in the Chinese World Order: Festschrift in Honour of 
Professor Wang Gungwu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), and Wang Gungwu and 
Zheng Yongnian, eds., China and the New International Order (New York: Routledge, 2008). A 
recent Chinese work that still upholds the rhetoric of “response to the West” is Lan Yuchun 蓝玉
春, Zhongguo waijiaoshi: benzhi yu shijian, chongji yu huiying 中国外交史：本质与事件、冲击
与回应 (Taipei: San Min Book Co., 2007), showing the resilience of the Fairbankian paradigm. 
 
8 John K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-
1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). 
9 Paul Cohen sees distortions and misinterpretations that have skewed Western assumptions and 
perceptions on China’s past, attributed to cultural biases and contextual dissonances. See Paul A. 
Cohen, Rediscovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past 
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There has since been a paradigm shift in the discussion of the “Chinese world order”. 
The “Chinese world order” remains in vogue, both in name and in content,10 but the 
emphasis is no longer on excusing Western imperialism in Asia. It now lies on examining 
the threat that China may pose to other countries by its rapid development into a world 
power,11 due to the immense power that China could seem to master from within made 
known by existing revisionist scholarship. The presence of large Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia and apprehension of the Chinese by native populations perpetuate the 
“China threat” and “yellow peril” theories already prevalent in some circles.12
At the other end of the spectrum, many Chinese historians seek the “Chinese 
world order” as a basis of support that China can co-exist peacefully with its neighbours. 
Turning to the old rhetoric of Chinese benevolence in response to tributary submission, 
these historians interpret the tribute system as a set of “international” relations that did 
place China above its tributary polities, but reason that the Chinese emphasis on virtue 
 Imperial 
China was “motivated” to carve out an empire in its expression of the “Chinese world 
order”, a variant of imperialism before the advent of the Europeans. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). William Skinner is famous for his work on China’s 
physiographic macroregions. See G. William Skinner and Hugh D. R. Barker et al, The City in Late 
Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977). Even if “modernity” does exist, it has 
its origins within indigenous developments inside local societies before colonialism. 
10 Kawashima Shin, “China’s Re-interpretation of the Chinese “World Order”, 1900-40s”, in 
Anthony Reid and Zheng Yangwen, eds., Negotiating Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia 
(Singapore: NUS Press 2009), pp. 139-158. 
11 An example of Western works in this vein is Geoff Wade, The Zheng He Voyages: A 
Reassessment (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2004). Such 
works have long been criticized by Chinese scholars to perpetuate the “China threat” and 
interrupt the “peaceful rise” of China. The “China threat”, amongst others, has also provided a 
reason for the continuous American military presence in Okinawa. 
12 Examples of some works on the issue are Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, eds., The China Threat: 
Perceptions, Myths and Reality (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), and Jan Lucassen and Leo 
Lucassen, eds., Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1997). See also Wu Hongjun 吴洪君, The Historical Legacy of Tributary System 
and Its Influence on Relations between China and Its Circumjacent Countries 朝贡体系的历史遗
产及其对中国与周边国家关系的影响 (MA dissertation, Shandong University, 2009). 
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instead of might even when China was economically and militarily powerful shows that 
China was not interested in acquiring overseas possessions in the form of colonies, and 
“peace-loving” China had always striven for harmonious relationships with its tributaries 
in accordance with the Confucian ideal.13 In general, these Chinese historians criticized 
the “China threat” hypothesis, arguing that tributary embassies arrived in China out of 
their admiration for the Chinese civilization, not of coercion and threat.14 According to 
these scholars, to facilitate the adoption of Chinese culture and institutions in order to 
consolidate political control and “civilize the margins”, tributary polities such as Korea 
and Vietnam had to subscribe to the Chinese worldview and adopt the Chinese script.15
                                                            
13 In essence, this Confucian ideal may be summed up in one phrase: Cherishing Men from Afar 
怀柔远人. James Hevia elaborates on the phrase in the Qing context: “the sage ruler showed 
compassion and benevolence to those who were outside his immediate dominion; he cherished 
those who traveled great distances to come to his court”. See James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men 
from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1995). Examples of Chinese works on the “Chinese world order” in this respect are Huang 
Zhilian 黄枝连, Tianchao lizhi tixi yanjiu (shangjuan): yazhou de huaxia zhixu 天朝礼制体系研究 
(上卷): 亚洲的华夏秩序 (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1992); Li Yunquan 李云泉, 
Chaogong zhidu shilun 朝贡制度史论 (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2004); He Fangchuan 何
芳川, ““Huayi zhixu” lun” “华夷秩序”论, Journal of Peking University 35, 6 (1998): 30-45. 
 
14 Kao Ming-shih, Tianxia zhixu yu wenhuaquan de tansuo 天下秩序与文化圈的探索 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2008); Gan Huai-chen 甘怀真, “”Tianxia” guannian de 
zaijiantao”, “天下”观念的再诠释 in Dongya jinshi shijieguan de xingcheng 东亚近世世界观
的形成, ed. Wu Chan-liang 吴展良 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2007), pp. 85-109; 
Zhu Yunying 朱云影, Zhongguo wenhua dui ri han yue de yingxiang 中国文化对日韩越的影响 
(Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2007). Western specialists have also contributed to the 
discussion of the “Chinese cultural zone”, but they lack a thematic focus because their interests 
lie elsewhere. See David E. Mungello, The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), p. 4, and Samuel Huntington, The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 45. The 
“Sinitic Zone” or “Sinic Zone” includes Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam, which were closest 
geographically and had borrowed extensively from Chinese culture, most notably the Chinese 
script and Confucianism. Nishijima refers to the “Chinese cultural zone” theory in his discussion 
of the “investiture system” model. See Nishijima, Higashi Ajia sekai to sakuho ̄taisei. 
15 Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese model: a comparative study of Vietnamese and 




This resulted in the emergence of “Little Chinas” during different periods of East Asian 
history, such as Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.16
However, Kao Ming-shih高明士 observes that the Chinese cultural influence on 
them was neither complete nor unconditional, contending that Chinese cultural imports 




Another issue arises where popular Eurocentric paradigms of modernization and 
imperialism subject the nation-state as a unit of analysis to history, and the glorification 
of China’s past by some Chinese scholars co-exists with the paradoxical emphasis on the 
unprecedented nature of the “modern” Communist nation-state.
 Kao contributes to the “peaceful-rise-of-China” hypothesis by 
arguing that because importers of Chinese culture seldom faced a serious military and 
political threat from China, their adaptations often involved selective borrowing within 
an acceptable cultural framework true to local conditions. The “Chinese cultural zone” 
was in essence formed by will, not by force, and a powerful China could be beneficial to 
regional development and world peace. 
18 The “China” subject 
is often regarded as an empire behaving like a “modern” nation-state. Several scholars 
have since attempted to drop the nation-state rhetoric.19
                                                            
16 For Korea, see Sun Weiguo 孙卫国, Daming qihao yu xiaozhonghua yishi: Chaoxian wangchao 
zunzhou siming wenti yanjiu, 1637-1800 大明旗号与小中华意识：朝鲜王朝尊周思明问题研究 
1637-1800 (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2007). For Vietnam, see Woodside, Vietnam and the 
Chinese model. 
 
17 Kao, Tianxia zhixu yu wenhuaquan de tansuo, pp. 234-235. 
18 Prasenjit Duara contends that “the nation as the subject of History is never able to completely 
bridge the aporia between the past and the present”. See Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from 
the Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 29. 
19 One is Chang Chi-Hsiung张启雄. See Chang, “Liuqiu qiming touqing de rentong zhuanhuan” 琉
球弃明投清的认同转换, in Dispute on Okinawa’s Identity in the East Asian History 琉球认同与
归属论争 (Taipei: Pronea, Academia Sinica, December 2001), pp. 1-62. 
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The existence and legitimacy of nation-states as appropriate units of analysis 
and action has led to the assumption that only nation-states were significant actors in 
the playing field and scant attention is accorded to the evaluation of social, cultural, and 
economic elements and their associated values.20 By this assumption, the Westphalian 
system of international relations based on equal sovereignty of nation-states was the 
political order that found itself in opposition to the hierarchical “Chinese world order” 
when the Europeans first “encountered” the Chinese, ignoring the existence of previous 
East-West interactions long before the Opium War. This rhetoric is firmly rebutted by a 
recent volume Negotiating Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia, which acknowledges the 
reality of rival ideologies to the “Chinese world order” and discusses separate worlds of 
diplomacy in Southeast Asia, not Europe, but its scope remains confined to the mapping 
of post-colonial political geography, stuck in nation-state manifestations.21
 
 
Diplomatic Relations between China and Ryukyu 
The name “Ryukyu” first appeared in Chinese annals during the Sui dynasty. It 
was recorded that Emperor Yang sent fleets in search of the “Land of Happy Immortals” 
to seek immortality. One of the fleets reached Ryukyu and demanded tribute from the 
                                                            
20 Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 
1984), p. xii. However, Mancall still maintains that the Chinese worldview was “decreasingly able 
to resolve the contradictions between China’s world and the world of its invaders” (p. xiv), hence 
subscribing to the “response to the West” hypothesis. The obsession with nation-states has 
continued in recent works, such as Warren I. Cohen’s East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand 
Years of Engagement with the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), in which East 
Asia was perceived as an international system. The desire to understand Communist China, now 
a sovereign nation-state, is central to the continuation of this obsession. 
21 Reid and Zheng, Negotiating Asymmetry. The volume reiterates that the “Chinese world order” 
is an oversimplification that ignores the complexity of international relations. The asymmetry of 
relations allowed each side of the maritime relationship to interpret the “Chinese world order” in 
various ways, while remaining in loose, nominal submission to the general order. 
9 
 
islanders but to no avail. A battle ensued and a thousand captives were forcibly taken to 
China. During the Yuan, the Chinese again demanded tribute from Ryukyu through an 
expedition and the Ryukyuans, once more, refused to comply. It was not until the Ming 
that a tributary relationship between China and Ryukyu was finally forged.22 Ryukyu was 
at that time experiencing the Three Kingdoms period. All three kingdoms competed for 
Ming favour and had engaged in diplomatic missions and tributary trade with China.23 
Sometimes the Ming would intervene in Ryukyuan polities, with Emperor Hongwu 洪武 
(r. 1368-1398) ordering the kingdoms to cease warfare. The Ming edicts failed to work, 
however, and both fighting and tributary trade continued.24 By imperial decree thirty-six 
families from Fujian migrated to Ryukyu and facilitated trade between the kingdom and 
other polities. Assisting the king in maritime matters, they enacted in time an extensive 
network known as the Ryukyu connection.25
Our analysis becomes clearer if we consider the withdrawal of Ming China from 
maritime expansion in the fifteenth century. Tributary trade became the one official and 
legal form of commerce beyond Chinese shores, and the Ming maritime ban forbade the 
Chinese from interacting with men from afar. The Ryukyu connection in effect sustained 
 
                                                            
22 Ryukyu is confused with Taiwan in Chinese records and it is now difficult, if not impossible, to 
discern between the two. By general consensus Ryukyu is known as the “Greater Ryukyu” and 
Taiwan, the “Lesser Ryukyu”. See Xu Yuhu 徐玉虎, Mingdai Liuqiu wangguo duiwai guanxi zhi 
yanjiu 明代琉球对外关系之研究 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 台湾学生书局, 1982), p. 9; 
and George H. Kerr, Okinawa, History of an Island People (Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 2000), pp. 1-
24. 
23 The other two kingdoms were Hokuzan and Nanzan. Eventually the strong economic prowess 
of the Chuzan kingdom, ruling from the Shuri castle and trading from the port of Naha, allowed it 
to unify the islands into the Ryukyu kingdom in 1429. See Matsuda Mitsugu, The Government of 
the Kingdom of Ryukyu, 1609–1872 (Naha: Yui Pub. Co., 2001), p. 16. 
24 Mi Qingyu 米庆余, Liuqiu lishi yanjiu 琉球历史研究 (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing 
House, 1998), pp. 29-56. 
25 See Hamashita, China, East Asia and the Global Economy, pp. 57-84; and Leonard Blusse, 
Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 15. 
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the Chinese maritime tradition before the lifting of the ban in 1567, after which Chinese 
merchants were endorsed and licensed to conduct trade with all except the Japanese.26 
The lift diminished Ryukyu’s role as an entrepot on East Asian shipping routes, but the 
kingdom remained engaged in maritime trade due to its active maintenance of tributary 
relations with China. The continued significance of Ryukyu was made apparent in 1609, 
when the Satsuma conquered the kingdom and managed relations with China on behalf 
of the Tokugawa bakufu to exploit mercantile profits.27
Conveniently located at the intersection between the Western and Eastern sea 
routes, the kingdom prided itself as a place filled in all directions with exotic goods and 
rich treasures, and as an intermediary between different trading parties.
 
28
Western scholarship on Ryukyu is scarce and patchy. George Kerr produces an 
account of Ryukyu’s past in Okinawa: History of an Island People, but his concern for 
 My research 
question is simple: why was the Ryukyu kingdom a successful entrepot? More explicitly, 
why did it bother pursuing tributary trade with China? 
                                                            
26 There is extensive literature on the Ming maritime ban and the Wokou pirates who had caused 
the official policy to shift, including So Kwan-wai, Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the 16th 
Century (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975); Chang Pin-Tsun, Chinese Maritime 
Trade: The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fuchien (Fukien) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms 
International, 1991); Robert J. Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and 
Seafarers in Late Imperial South China (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003); Chen 
Shangsheng 陈尚胜, “Huairou” yu “yishang”: Mingdai haiyang liliang xingshuai yanjiu “怀柔”
与“抑商”：明代海洋力量兴衰研究 (Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1997); 
Wang Rigen 王日根, Mingqing haijiang zhengce yu zhongguo shehui fazhan 明清海疆政策与中
国社会发展 (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Publishing House, 2006). 
27 See for instance Sakihara Mitsugu, The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances during the 
Tokugawa Period (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1971); Matsuda, The Government of 
the Kingdom of Ryukyu; and Robert Ingels Hellyer, A Tale of Two Domains: Satsuma, Tsushima, 
and the System of Foreign Relations in Late Edo Period Japan (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford 
University, 2001). 
28 To the Chinese, the Western route led from the Fujian province and covered the Philippine 
islands, the coasts of Indo-China, and the East Indies, while the Eastern one encompassed Japan, 
Ryukyu, and Taiwan. See Zhang Xie 张燮, Dong xi yang kao 东西洋考 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 




modern-day Okinawa is obvious and its presence as a kingdom is not covered in detail.29 
Gregory Smits offers a more specialized study by examining the varied visions of Ryukyu 
that are subject to contestation from within Ryukyu and without.30 American-Japanese 
scholars contribute with their empirical research on the China-Ryukyu-Japan tripartite 
relationship, emphasizing the aftermath of the conquest of Ryukyu by Satsuma.31
The issue of Ryukyuan identity is not the main concern of Chinese scholarship. 
Rather, Chinese scholars emphasize how Chinese emperors had bestowed favours on 
the Ryukyu kingdom, and how such benevolence had contributed substantially to the 
kingdom’s cultural, economic, political, and social development.
 Their 
studies illuminate the identity-representation problematic in which Ryukyu assumes 
multiple identities: a Chinese-Japanese dual vassal, an American protectorate-base, a 
Japanese prefecture-colony, or an independent polity. Of exceptional concern to these 
scholars is the “ambiguous” period between 1609 and 1879, when Ryukyu offered dual 
submission but remained politically independent. 
32 Some bear nationalist 
tendencies in their accounts.33
                                                            
29 Kerr, Okinawa, History of an Island People. 
 Others see the Satsuma invasion of Ryukyu as a sign of 
30 Gregory Smits, Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999). The “early-modern” stretches from the seventeenth 
to the nineteenth century. 
31 Matsuda, The Government of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, and Sakihara, The Significance of Ryukyu 
in Satsuma Finances during the Tokugawa Period. 
32 The Chinese writings on the topic are too numerous to be listed here. They include Xu, Mingdai 
Liuqiu wangguo duiwai guanxi zhi yanjiu; Xie Bizhen谢必震, Zhongguo yu Liuqiu 中国与琉球 
(Fuzhou: Xiamen University Press, 1996); and Mi Qingyu, Liuqiu lishi yanjiu. 
33 Yang Zhongkui杨仲揆, Liuqiu gujin tan: jianlun diaoyutai wenti 琉球古今谈：兼论钓鱼台问
题 (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1990). Yang argues that the 36 families from Fujian ignited 
the cultural efflorescence in Ryukyu, and that Chinese embassy records show that the Diaoyutai 
钓鱼台 (or Senkaku) islands belong to China and not Japan. Similar views have been echoed in 
Song Shu-shi 宋漱石, Liuqiu guishu wenti 琉球归属问题 (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe 
中央文物供应社, 1954), and Zheng Hailin 郑海麟, Diaoyudao lieyu zhi lishi yu fali yanjiu 钓鱼岛
列屿之历史与法理研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中华书局, 2007). These scholars have in short 
claimed for China the Diaoyutai islands, Ryukyu, or both. 
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early Japanese imperialism.34 For one, Yang Zhongkui 杨仲揆 deems Ryukyu “barbaric” 
before formal relations were established with the Ming, and in celebration of Chinese 
culture, posits that a positive stream of influences from China “opened” the kingdom up 
to civilization until the Japanese annexation in 1879. Some Chinese historians who have 
tried to maintain an objective stance, such as Xu Yuhu 徐玉虎, Cheng Liangsheng 郑樑
生, and T’sao Yung-he 曹永和, also devote greater attention to China than to Ryukyu.35
Mainland Japanese scholars, on the other hand, understand the kingdom as part 
of a comprehensive maritime network in Asia. They deal with the complex interplay of 
diplomatic relations between Ryukyu, China, and Japan, but their foremost concern is 
economic and Ryukyu is relegated a subordinate role.
 
They are sometimes guilty of presenting the latter as backward and stagnant, a similar 
charge made on the Fairbankian School for its depiction of China. 
36
                                                            
34 Cai Zhang 蔡璋, Liuqiu wangguo shitan 琉球王国史谭 (Taipei: Zheng zhong 正中, 1954). 
 Their findings advocate that 
Chinese influences on Ryukyu were predominantly economic in nature, and the Chinese 
investiture of Ryukyuan kings was a ritual and tool in the service of trade. It is here that 
35 Xu Yuhu, Mingdai Liuqiu wangguo duiwai guanxi zhi yanjiu; Mingdai yu Liuqiu wangguo guanxi 
zhi yanjiu 明代与琉球王国关系之研究  (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1986); Cheng 
Liangsheng, Zhongri guanxishi yanjiu lunji 中日关系史研究论集 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe 
文史哲出版社, 1990); and T’sao Yung-he, Zhongguo haiyangshi lunji 中国海洋史论集 (Taipei: 
Linking Publishing, 2000). Cheng’s focus lies in Sino-Japanese relations, while T’sao reasons that 
Ming-Ryukyu relations were forged on the grounds that the Chinese needed to procure horses 
and acquire intelligence on the Wokou pirates from Ryukyu, both of which were for military 
purposes and coastal defense. Most, if not all, Chinese scholars begin the narrative of Ryukyu’s 
past with the Ming, giving only slight mention to the “pre-history” of the islands. 
36 Kobata Atsushi小葉田淳 is a pioneer of Ryukyu studies in mainland Japan, and has translated 
parts of the Lidai Baoan into English. Kobata Atsushi, Chu ̄ sei nantō tsūkō bōekishi no kenkyū 中世
南島通交貿易史の研究 (Research on Traffic and Trade of Medieval Southern Islands) (Tokyo: 
Toko Shoin, 1968); Kobata, Ryukyuan Relations with Korea and South Sea countries: an annotated 
translation of documents in the Rekidai Hoan (Kyoto: Publisher unknown, 1969). See also 
Hamashita, Okinawa nyu ̄ mon; Murai Shosuke村井章介, Minatomachi to kaiiki sekai港町と海域
世界 (Port Cities and the Maritime World) (Tokyo: Aokishoten, 2005); and Murai Shosuke, 
Studies of Medieval Ryukyu within Asia's Maritime Network (Tokyo: Toho Gakkai, 2008). 
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the legacy of Iha Fuyu伊波普猷, the father of Ryukyuan studies, is obvious. Iha explores 
the folklore, history, and language of Ryukyu, concluding that Ryukyuan culture bears a 
natural affinity with that of mainland Japanese. On cultural grounds, Iha justifies Ryukyu 
to be part of Japan.37 Iha’s view is expanded by Higashionna Kanjun東恩納寬惇, who 
ascribes the cultural differences between Ryukyu and Japan to Satsuma’s control of the 
former. 38
Researchers hailing from Okinawa play a significant role in the scholarship on 
the Ryukyu kingdom. In Okinawa, forces of localism remain strong, and calls for greater 
autonomy or complete independence exist. The historical basis on which such calls are 
made is offered by the former glories of the Ryukyu kingdom. Tomiyama Kazuyuki豊見
山和行construes the image of a kingdom that was once independent and prosperous.
 The aforementioned Chinese specialists in the field have evocatively argued, 
however, that many of these debts, if they were ever owed, were to China. 
39 
Takara Kurayoshi高良倉吉, in tandem with the call for greater autonomy, emphasizes 
Ryukyu’s individual identity and characteristics and the historical significance of the old 
kingdom with regard to the new prefecture.40
                                                            
37 Iha Fuyu, Ko Ryukyu 古琉球 (Old Ryukyu) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000). The book was first 
published in 1922. 
 He understands Ryukyu to be politically 
independent within the Tokugawa bakuhan system, suggesting that the kingdom was a 
38 See Higashionna Kanjun, Ryukyu shi gaikan琉球史概觀 (An Overview of Ryukyuan History) 
(Tokyo: Keimeikai Jimusho, 1925) and Ryukyu no rekishi琉球の歴史 (History of Ryukyu) (Tokyo: 
Shibundo, 1966). 
39 See Tomiyama Kazuyuki, Ryukyu o ̄ koku no gaiko ̄  to ōken琉球王国の外交と王権 (Diplomacy 
and Royal Authority of the Ryukyu Kingdom) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2004). See also 
Takara Kurayoshi and Tomiyama Kazuyuki, Ryukyu Okinawa to kaijo ̄no michi琉球沖縄と海上の
道 (Ryukyu-Okinawa and Sea Routes) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2005). 
40 See Takara Kurayoshi, Ryukyu o ̄ koku琉球王国 (The Ryukyu Kingdom) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1993) and Ajia no naka no Ryukyu o ̄ kokuアジアのなかの琉球王国 (The Ryukyu Kingdom in 
Asia) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1998). In a similar vein Dana Masayuki田名真之 examines 
the Ryukyuan aristocracy in detail and produces an exhaustive account of official histories of the 
old kingdom. See Dana Masayuki, Okinawa Ryukyu o ̄ koku burabura ̄sanpo沖縄琉球王国ぶらぶ
らぁ散步 (A Stroll in Okinawa’s Ryukyu Kingdom) (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2009). 
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domain enjoying great autonomy despite Satsuma’s occasional intervention. Others, 
such as Akamine Mamoru赤嶺守and Harada Nobuo原田禹雄, attune their research to 
the influx of Chinese culture during the Ming-Qing period.41
 
 Whether to emphasize 
individuality or to reiterate Chinese influences on Ryukyu, most Okinawan scholars seek 
to throw off the thick yoke of cultural rhetoric, economic grip, and political domination 
by mainland Japan, in both the past and present. 
The Plurality of Voices in Ryukyuan Historiography 
Prasenjit Duara adeptly notes the existence of “complex transactions between 
premodern representations of political community and the modern nation”, contending 
that “modern nationalism seeks to appropriate these pre-existing representations into 
the mode of being of the modern nation”.42 Administrations around today’s world use 
and reinvent their national histories to explain, justify, or enhance the “inevitability” of 
their contemporary roles, their “imagined communities”.43
The term “modern” may be disputable, but Duara’s comments are constructive 
in addressing the issues of identity and nationalism in contemporary China, Japan, and 
Okinawa. The imaginative (re)construction of nations and regions are historical projects, 
and the growth of Ryukyu and its attempts at forging new relationships with Ming China 
 
                                                            
41 See Akamine Mamoru, Ryukyu o ̄ koku: Higashi Ajia no ko ̄ nā sutōn琉球王国: 東アジアのコー
ナーストーン (The Ryukyu Kingdom: The Cornerstone of East Asia) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2004); 
and Harada Nobuo, Ryukyu to Chu ̄ goku : wasurerareta sakuho ̄ shi琉球と中国 : 忘れられた冊
封使 (Ryukyu and China: The Forgotten Emissaries) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003) and 
Hoshu okan封舟往還 (The Departure and Return of Tributary Missions) (Ginowan: Yoju Shorin, 
2007). Both Akamine and Harada explore the connections between the Ryukyu kingdom and 
China, subscribing to the “Sinicization” paradigm adopted by many Chinese scholars. 
42 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 27. 
43 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 2006). 
15 
 
and the East Asian region present an excellent example of the intersection of national 
and regional imaginations. Ryukyuan kings had moved beyond a celebration of vassal 
identity to the Ming into a broader, regional network of the brotherhood of equals. This 
endeavour was entwined in the complexities of rivalry between Ming-Qing China and 
Satsuma-Tokugawa Japan, which competed for the loyalties of the kingdom. Such rivalry 
has persisted to the present. To many Chinese, the annexation of Ryukyu in 1879 was a 
formalization of Japan’s “premodern” imperialist ambitions.44
These historical episodes continue to bear their imprints in contemporary Sino-
Japanese relations. By the twentieth century, the Chinese viewed as “lost territory” 失
地 the lands now identified as the entire Korean peninsula, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, 
and the Penghu islands, amongst others.
 
45 After 1937, the conflict with Japan prompted 
the Guomindang (KMT) elite of the Republic of China (ROC) to reconsider the status of 
territory “lost” to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 characterized Japan’s seizure of the 
Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan as a scheme to encircle and subjugate China.46
                                                            
44 Some Japanese scholars, however, argue that the issue of alleged Japanese aggression on 
other polities has to be examined from the world history perspective, drawing comparisons with 
similar acts such as those by the Manchus of China and Napoleon Bonaparte of France. These 
studies suggest that the Japanese invasions of Choson Korea and the Ryukyu kingdom were top-
down efforts aimed at fostering national unity and solidarity and bringing about the “modern” 
Japanese nation. See Bito Masahide尾藤正英, Nihon bunka no rekishi日本文化の歴史 (History 
of Japanese Culture) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000). 
 Delineating 
China’s territory up to the Opium War incursions, Chiang writes that there was “not a 
single region which had not been deeply under the influence of Chinese culture”, and 
urges the Chinese people to see the “impairments” of Chinese territory in the century 
45 Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan: Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), p. 50. 
46 Liu Xiaoyuan, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the 
Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 65. 
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after 1842 as a “national humiliation”, and to “eliminate the humiliation and to save the 
country until China’s territorial integrity has been fully restored”.47
We can thus infer that, from the Chinese perspective, Ryukyu was under strong 
Chinese influence and fell within Chiang’s definition of “Chinese territory”. T.V. Soong 宋
子文 is reported to have declared that “China will recover Manchuria, Taiwan, and the 
Ryukyu Islands after the war and Korea will be independent.”
  
48 The People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) echoes parallel claims over Taiwan and Tibet and renounces that over the 
Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), but this does not dislodge the Chinese from contesting the 
legitimacy of Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa.49 The Chinese portrayal in scholarship 
and popular media of close Sino-Ryukyuan relationships was a contemporary variant of 
the old tributary system of polities situated in the Chinese sphere of influence.50
On the other hand, Japan has conventionally been regarded as a monocultural 
society. Industrial growth during the Meiji Restoration and rapid postwar recovery and 
economic growth have allowed the Japanese to differentiate themselves as a pure and 
 These 
portrayals reinforce images of a generous China and a rapacious Japan. 
                                                            
47 Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny 中国之命运 (Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye 黎明文化事业, 
1976), p. 8. Chiang, however, declined the American offer to take control of Vietnam. See Henry 
A. Wallace, Toward World Peace (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948), p. 47. 
48 Wachman, Why Taiwan, p. 79. 
49 When the United States announced in 1970 that it would revert administrative power over 
Okinawa back to Japan, mass activities among Chinese communities began to spread from the 
United States to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Europe, and other parts of the world. See 
Yung-deh Richard Chu, “Historical and Contemporary Roots of Sino-Japanese Conflicts”, in China 
and Japan at Odds: Deciphering the Perpetual Conflict, ed. James C. Hsiung (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 29-30. The keen interest of the Chinese in the South China Sea could be 
explained by the possible access to the seabed oil and gas resources over which the PRC claims 
sovereign rights under international law. Japan claims the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands as 
part of the Okinawa Prefecture, which as a result becomes embroiled in the ensuing territorial 
conflict. See James C. Hsiung, “Sea Power, Law of the Sea, and a Sino-Japanese East China Sea 
“Resource War””, in China and Japan at Odds, pp. 133-153. 
50 Wu, The Historical Legacy of Tributary System and Its Influence on Relations between China and 
Its Circumjacent Countries. 
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homogenous race, as having a strong and “modern” state to lead the people to their 
greatness.51 However, Japan “has long been ‘multicultural’, and that what is distinctive 
is the success with which that diversity has been cloaked by the ideology of ‘uniqueness’ 
and ‘monoculturalism’.”52 The theoretical framework of the Japanese ideology was first 
challenged when Hokkaido and Okinawa were incorporated into Japan proper, as the 
inhabitants in these territories had to be redefined in relation to Japan. In the end, these 
inhabitants were refashioned as different in terms of time rather than space, that is, as 
“backward” rather than foreign.53 This is compatible with the dominant idea that 
Ryukyu was mired in the “primitive” traditions that it had once shared with Japan, 
having lagged behind the mainland which had advanced to modernity.54 Purportedly 
archaic, these “traditions” are invented products of the present and hence artificial.55
For Okinawans, however, Ryukyu remained a focal point of pride and identity. 
Memories of its cosmopolitan nature constitute the raw material of identity. Nostalgia 
as a form of historical consciousness was necessary to the construction of a nationalist 
 
                                                            
51 In the words of one scholar, the “Japanese monoethnic ideology is hardly unique and is in fact 
simply a more virulent form of nationalism, which is a powerful and ubiquitous ideology of 
modernity…… a project that seeks to achieve cultural and linguistic unification of diverse peoples 
into a singular nationality within clearly defined political boundaries”. See John Lie, Multiethnic 
Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 178-179. 
52 Gavan McCormack, “Introduction”, in Donald Denoon, Mark Hudson, Gavan McCormack, and 
Tessa Morris-Suzuki, eds., Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 3. The Meiji state first annexed Hokkaido in 1873, Ryukyu 
in 1879, Taiwan in 1895, and Korea in 1910, and had made significant conquests in Asia and the 
western Pacific. It can be justified then to suggest that “the rise of imperial Japan was coeval with 
the growth of multiethnic Japan”, with different ethnicities being incorporated into the Japanese 
polity. See Lie, Multiethnic Japan, p. 89. In essence, the complex and historically graded genesis 
of Japanese culture, albeit controversial, has to be recognized. 
53 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “A Descent into the Past: the frontier in the construction of Japanese 
history”, in Multicultural Japan, pp. 81-94. 
54 Smits, Visions of Ryukyu, pp. 151-152. Many linguists regard Ryukyuan as a Japanese dialect. 
They argue that the political division between Kyushu and Ryukyu prevented linguistic diffusion. 
See Masayoshi Shibatani, The Languages of Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
pp. 191-196. 
55 See Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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culture in the Japanese prefecture. The main thesis of the Ryukyu kingdom narrative is 
that they were not always Japanese. The economic achievements of the kingdom and its 
far-flung trading networks are a supplementary yet vital theme of remembrance, stirring 
the imagination of the Okinawans to create a collective identity against mainland Japan. 
The account of Ryukyu’s cosmopolitan history is a snub at the purportedly homogenous 
mainland.56
However, the representations of the prefecture in its “premodern” forms can be 
validated by G. W. F. Hegel’s assertion that self-consciousness emerges only in societies 
with states that have recorded and recognized their progress in history.
 Proponents of this narrative, nevertheless, are often accused of politicizing 
culture and romanticizing the Ryukyu kingdom in a bid to increase their bargaining chips 
for greater political autonomy. 
57
                                                            
56 See Laura Hein and Mark Selden, “Culture, Power, and Identity in Contemporary Okinawa”, in 
Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and 
American Power (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 10. Alleged atrocities committed by 
Japanese soldiers during World War II and especially the Battle of Okinawa, coupled with the 
failure of the Tokyo government(s) to move American military bases off Okinawa, have frustrated 
many Okinawans and lent voice to sporadic calls for independence from Japan. They feel much 
betrayed that the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 did not result in the final withdrawal of American 
Marines from the islands. Some have deftly argued that the modern history of Okinawa could be 
characterized as a struggle between Okinawans and the American-Japanese alliance. See Arasaki 
Moriteru 新崎盛暉, Okinawa gendaishi: shinpan 沖繩現代史: 新版 (The Modern History of 
Okinawa: New Edition) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005); Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in 
Okinawa (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); and Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle 
in Okinawa (New York: Routledge, 2006). These studies reveal that Okinawa encompasses socio-
economically diverse multilingual and multicultural islands and regions. 
 Ryukyu’s Lidai 
Baoan历代宝案, or “Precious Records of Successive Generations”, not only compiles the 
diplomatic documents of the Ryukyuan kingship, but also provides the linkage of the 
oneness of a territorial domain and a self-conscious people from the past to the present. 
The desire to assemble from archaeological and literary records a distinctive Ryukyuan 
identity has strengthened since the islands were returned from American administration 
57 Georg W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, transl. J. Sibree (New York: Prometheus Books, 
1991), p. 2. 
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to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, challenging Japan’s “identity politics” and pretensions 
of monoculturalism. The independent, cosmopolitan, and hence different experience of 
Ryukyu during the Ming, when it served as “the Bridge between Myriad Lands”, offers a 
point of departure from Japan’s historical development and trajectory, engendering 
Okinawa’s exceptional place in Japanese historical identity.58 As one scholar succinctly 
contends, “the making of modern Japan was simultaneously the making of multiethnic 
Japan”.59
 
 On the other hand, the making of modern Okinawa is the active maintenance 
of a sense of individual integrity under a dual Japanese-Okinawan identity. 
Ritual and Region of the Tributary System 
From this corpus of literature we can draw a few general but useful conclusions. 
Most scholars use the tributary system as a point of departure for their investigation of 
relations between the Ryukyu and other polities. They deem it legitimate to regard the 
tributary system as a medium for trade. Ryukyu, along with other participating polities 
in the tribute system, offered tribute to China to gain imperial audience and favour and 
hence official permission to conduct diplomacy and trade under Chinese hospices. Two 
disputes remain, however. One is about the underlying aim of the Chinese in enacting at 
high costs the spectacle of the “Chinese world order” and its auxiliary tributary system 
beneath the rhetoric of benevolence in official documents. The other is about the kind 
of influences that China and other polities had in shaping Ryukyuan identity. These are 
the disputes that this thesis aims to resolve. 
                                                            
58 McCormack, “Introduction”, in Multicultural Japan, p. 7. 
59 Lie, Multiethnic Japan, p. 110. 
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My main thesis is that Ryukyuan kings were fully aware of how their relationship 
with the Ming emperor could contribute to their performance as a ruler. I examine the 
kings’ practices and self-representations as complex cultural, political, and social acts of 
promulgating messages and words in a material and visual manner, through the media 
of culture, investitures, and tablets. The engagement in things Chinese was inseparable 
from their exercise of kingship. Far from the received notion that tribute was an act of 
submission for trade, such arrangements reflect the Ryukyuan kings’ determination to 
harness investitures and trade to the work of the Shuri-Naha enterprise—the rule of 
culture and ritual. Recognizing this function of tribute for Ryukyu substantially subverts 
the myth of “tribute for trade”, and I contend for a reinterpretation of the “Chinese 
world order” as a ritual order. It seems logical to associate these exchanges with ritual 
because the Board of Rites of Ming China had under its jurisdiction both religious and 
tributary matters of the empire. 
Ritual was, to both the Chinese and the Ryukyuans, designed to maintain order, 
preserve cultural unity, and foster an illusion of imperial power. It generated a sphere of 
exclusivity, cultivating group solidarity and providing its ruler an instrument of control. 
As chapters 2 and 3 shall show, Ming gifts and investitures were utilized as instruments 
of cultured rule by early Ryukyuan kings who saw sufficient value in participating in the 
Sinocentric tributary system. The aim of the chapters is to demonstrate the complex and 
dynamic relationship between Ryukyu and Ming China. Investitures, rituals, and tribute 
were all sites of contestation and negotiation between the two polities.60
                                                            
60 As an ideal, the Chinese endeavoured to use ritual (virtue) rather than military prowess (might) 




Hamashita Takeshi has advocated the adoption of the regional approach, which 
makes it possible to reconstruct the whole historical process of Asia including modern 
Asia.61
A word is in order about my selection of the Ryukyu kingdom and the period 
from 1372 to 1526 to be the thematic concerns of this thesis. Observing China from the 
outside allows us to spot historical events and realities that had occurred beyond both 
the political boundaries of contemporary China and the cultural definitions of Chinese-
ness. The Ryukyu network offers the perfect analytical lens through which we can see 
the workings of late imperial China in its totality. It is often said that the only way to 
know the present is to know the past, but little has been said about knowing the nation 
by knowing the region, and it is the thesis’s contention that the latter is of paramount 
importance for a comprehensive understanding of late imperial China. I am convinced 
 However, I dispute Hamashita’s claim that the tributary system was primarily a 
form of trade, because I see trade as an instrument to gain a foothold in the tributary 
system. Chapter 4 engages why Ryukyu had concerned itself with participating in the 
system beyond the rhetoric of economic benefits, and discusses how the “Chinese world 
order” could be perceived to bring prestige to all participants regardless of hierarchical 
rank. Regional networks allowed the tributary system to function, one of them being the 
Ryukyu network. The self-perceived role of early Ryukyuan kings for their kingdom in 
the regional ritual order was that of a mediator of culture, politics, and trade, a bridge 
between myriad lands under Ming patronage. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
中国近世社会の秩序形成 (The Formation of Social Order in Modern China) (Kyoto: Kyoto 
Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyu ̄ jo, 2004). 
61 Giovanni Arrighi, Hamashita Takeshi, Mark Selden, eds., The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 
and 50 Year Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2003). Gan Huai-chen uses “East Asia” to replace 
the nation-state narrative. See Gan, Huangquan, liyi yu jingdian quanshi 皇权礼仪与经典诠释 
(Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2008). 
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by John Wills’s argument that the tributary system did not predate the Ming, based on 
the premise that a set of bureaucratized and systemized characteristics and coherent 
institutional structures emerged only during the Ming, as opposed to mere beliefs or 
values that had situated the tributary system only on theoretical grounds.62
 
 It was also 
during the Ming that the Chinese were seen most actively or conspicuously engaged in 
sending overseas missions to exact tribute from other polities. The analysis ends with 
1526, the final year of King Sho Shin’s reign starting from 1477. The reign is hailed as 
“the Great Days of Chuzan”, one of unprecedented peace and prosperity in Ryukyuan 
history. It is the task of the concluding chapter to examine how far the tributary system 
has extended into the present, and what implications it holds for present-day China and 
Okinawa. The thesis shall end with an evaluation of the validity of cultural studies and 






                                                            
62 John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666-
1687 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), pp. 14-23. Wills 
argues that the tribute system was a form of defense and downplays its economic attributes. 
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2. In the Image of the Ming Emperor 
 
The Land where Ritual Propriety is Observed 
The period between the early fifteenth and the late sixteenth centuries was one 
of material abundance for the Ryukyu kingdom, which prospered as an entrepot in an 
extensive commercial network that had stretched across much of Asia. In 1372, Chuzan, 
one of the three rivaling polities on Okinawa, was invested by Ming China as a vassal. 
Subsequently, the other two polities also forged tributary relations with the Ming until 
1429, when Chuzan conquered all of Okinawa and established the Ryukyu kingdom. In 
1609, the kingdom was invaded by Satsuma forces and forced into dual subordination to 
the Ming and the Satsuma domain. Henceforth, Ryukyu has been mentioned in various 
discussions as a “semi-independent” kingdom that owed multiple allegiances to other 
polities, enmeshed in an Asian trading network.63
In his book Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought 
and Politics, Gregory Smits argues that Ryukyu’s ambivalent position in the intricate web 
of East Asian geopolitics resulted in many attempts by the kingdom’s leading thinkers to 




                                                            
63 See Robert K. Sakai, “The Ryukyu (Liu-Ch’iu) Islands as a Fief of Satsuma”, and Ch’en Ta-tuan, 
“Investiture of Liu-Ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period”, in The Chinese World Order, pp. 112-134, 
135-164. 
 His starting point is 1609, which he in particular sees as the beginning 
64 Smits, Visions of Ryukyu. See also Gregory Smits, “Ambiguous Boundaries: Redefining Royal 
Authority in the Kingdom of Ryukyu”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 60, 1 (June 2000): 89-
123. Smits positions Ryukyuan thinkers on central stage and allows them to speak for themselves 
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of an intellectual efflorescence on the political status of Ryukyu. In Smits’s opinion, the 
struggle over ideology was one for political power among different elements of the elite 
classes. While Smits is right on this count, it may be inaccurate to ascribe the struggle to 
the Satsuma invasion. Michel Foucault has cautioned us against turning our attention 
“away from vast unities like ‘periods’ or ‘centuries’ to the phenomena of rupture, of 
discontinuity”,65 which suspends a possible accumulation of knowledge and obscure 
undercurrents of slow but nevertheless existing developments. However, Smits seems 
to suggest that, before 1609, there was little or no intellectual debate on such ambiguity 
and how the kingdom could or should exist in an environment surrounded by powerful 
others. Ryukyu had been rich in internal developments since its inception as a kingdom, 
and these developments offered the foundation on which thinkers of later generations 
would depend on to rationalize their kingdom’s predicament.66
Scholars of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam often assert that the people or polities in 
these places bore the trait of studying and adopting Chinese influences, most notably 
Confucianism, and modeled their bureaucracy and institutions closely after the Chinese 
empire, creating in effect “Little Chinas” in China’s cultural orbit.
 
67
                                                                                                                                                                  
through their writings, citing notable figures such as Sho Shoken, Tei Junsoku, and Sai On and 
explaining their attempts to make sense of Ryukyu’s ambiguous political status in relation to 
stronger polities in China and Japan. 
 A major shortcoming 
of these studies looms that they fail to address why the “Little Chinas” needed to seek 
such adoptions to consolidate their political rule. There is a tendency in these studies to 
assume that Chinese influences were positive ones for polities “lesser” than China to 
65 Michel Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4. 
66 I have obviously been influenced by the “total history” approach of the Annales School. The 
lack of published sources and texts on the Ryukyu kingdom, however, does not permit for an 
extensive study of all the relevant actors, and I can only focus on the kings and royal elites on 
whom the records were written. 
67 See Chapter 1, pp. 1-8. 
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emulate, subscribing to a “strong state” thesis that posits that only strong states possess 
the ability to regulate discourse over a large cultural area. How were kings and elites 
empowered by their adoption of a “higher” culture?68
Remains of castled villages that dot the landscape of modern-day Okinawa serve 
as a testament to the old centre-periphery tensions between the king and his political 
subjects. By 1429, the Chuzan king had gained enough predominance over much of the 
Ryukyuan archipelago to claim the existence of the Ryukyu kingdom in his writings to 
the Ming emperor. However, the king’s rule over his subjects and territories was never 
complete. The remnant castles were those of the ajis, local warlords who controlled 
Ryukyu before King Sho Hashi 尚巴志 (r. 1422-1439) unified Okinawa under Chuzan. The 
ajis continued to wield much power at the local level after the unification by claiming to 
possess the capacity to influence the forces of nature. Priestesses enjoyed significant 
power in the kingdom as well, based on native traditions of solar worship and the folk 
religion of onarigami that entrenched female spiritual power.
 How did they convince their 
subjects that they deserve to remain in the upper echelon of society? Why did they 
choose to orient themselves ideologically and institutionally towards China when there 
were more indigenous models and traditions to follow? This chapter situates the early 
Ryukyuan kings in the context of East Asian geopolitics, showing them as precursors of 
Sai On and his ilk of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
69
                                                            
68 Cultural exchanges came in the form of regular emissary visits, which served to gather political 
and economic information and nurture a breed of scholars and translators. 
 They were significant 
69 Sakima Toshikatsu 崎間敏勝, "Omoro" no shiso「おもろ」の思想 (“Omoro” Thought) 
(Yonabaru-cho: Ryukyu Bunka Rekishi Kenkyujo, 1990). Smits offers an excellent account of the 
high priestesses and describes their transition from empowering agents with powers which were 
on par with those of the king and his male officials, to technical specialists subordinate to the 
Ryukyuan kingship when the institutionalization of the onarigami belief was complete. See Smits, 
“Ambiguous Boundaries”. Arne Rokkum has also written extensively on how ritual had imparted 
authority to women. See Arne Rokkum, Goddesses, Priestesses and Sisters: Mind, Gender and 
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political brokers but subject to local power relations themselves. Smits refers to strong 
circumstantial evidence that local populations frequently overthrew ruling warlords 
whose physical and spiritual power seemed to be on the wane, suggesting that power 
relations at the local level were highly volatile.70 The ajis could in turn bring a new ruler 
to power, as mentioned in a political intrigue in the Nanzan kingdom.71
The Ryukyuan kingship was aware of the precarious political environment it was 
in and of the potential threat posed by local powers to the stability and sustainability of 
the monarchy. Externally, it was well-versed in the art of diplomacy, having interacted 
with Ming China and other polities at the eve of the kingdom’s founding. Driven by a 
desire to curb the power of the ajis and the priestesses, Ryukyuan kings sought strength 
from without, relying on a Chinese-inspired model of positioning the king at the centre. 
Creating and disseminating the royal image became a great task at hand, with the 
eventual goal of making the kingship the principal institution that tied the present to the 
past. The Ming’s active pursuit of tributary relations with surrounding polities at the 
dynasty’s outset presented the Ryukyu kingdom an opportunity to enrich itself through 
foreign trade, and I argue that the kingship viewed trade as a by-product of their own 
political motivations. In the reigns of early Ryukyuan kings, the kingship saw trade as a 
means to subsidize the high costs of supporting a Chinese lifestyle in an agrarian society 
 A reconstruction 
of Ryukyuan history should note that Ryukyu was a coalescence of local power centres 
that owed their nominal allegiance to Shuri, and that whatever cohesion it attained was 
at best tenuous, especially during the reigns of its early kings. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Power in the Monarchic Tradition of the Ryukyus (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1998) and 
Nature, Ritual, and Society in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
70 Smits, “Ambiguous Boundaries”, p. 97. 
71 Ming taizong shilu 明太宗实录 juan 162 (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia 
Sinica, 1966), p. 1840. 
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and forging its own identity and image. The kings regarded China as a generic term or 
place for civilization, and had to convince the rest in the kingdom that this was so to 
meet their political ends. Conspicuous ritual spectacles of investiture and tributary 
missions were one sure way to attract the attention of the king’s subjects and to draw 
them under a ritual umbrella with the king at the ferrule. Supplementary measures 
included sending members of the royal clan, aji descendants, and even priestesses to 
China for Confucian learning and education, as well as the appropriation of Chinese rites 
and symbols to suit ceremonial needs. This chapter hopes to shed light on how cultural 
borrowings and economic wealth could translate into political power for their agents 
and beneficiaries, using Ryukyu as an example. The kingdom was deemed so ritually 
concerned that it was awarded a Ming edict that read “The Land where Ritual Propriety 
is Observed” 守礼之邦 in 1576, much to the delight of its king. 
 
The Politics of Royal Consumption and Practices 
King Satto’s 察度 reign (r. 1350-95) was the turning point of the history of Sino-
Ryukyuan relations. Although it was the Ming which took the initiative to send overseas 
embassies and establish formal ties with Chuzan, agency rested with the latter’s kings 
whose predecessors had successfully resisted Chinese appeals or threats for tribute. 
King Satto chose to offer tribute, sending his younger brother to Nanjing in 1372.72
                                                            
72 Ming taizu shilu 明太祖实录 juan 71 (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia 
Sinica, 1966), p. 1317. It is a pity that there has been no Ryukyuan account of this event. 
 In 
1392, the king dispatched his sons, including his heir-apparent, a nephew, and a son of 
an aji as part of his tribute delegation to the Ming, requesting for approval to study in 
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China and for skilled personnel to assist in his administration.73
Kumemura assumed responsibility for documentation, navigation, negotiation, 
and other technical services essential to the conduct of trade and tribute under Shuri. 
The Shuri consolidation of power owed much to Kumemura stewardship. A Chinese-
style palace was built in Shuri, and major public works in the form of roads, shrines, and 
temples were undertaken. Local ajis remained largely autonomous before the sixteenth 
century, and Shuri was only one power centre among numerous others.
 These skilled personnel 
eventually formed the settlement of Kumemura 久米村 in the port city of Naha. Many 
Chinese scholars claim that the residents of Kumemura had contributed substantially to 
the cultural and technological developments of the Ryukyuan society. Such a claim lies 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is important to note here that Kumemura had 
been active in shaping the Chuzan (and Ryukyuan) kingship. 
74 Shuri 首里 
literally refers to “head village” in both Chinese and Ryukyuan languages. So perilous 
was the Chuzan-Ryukyu kingship that King Bunei 武宁 (r. 1398-1406), King Satto’s heir, 
was ousted by an aji by the name of Hashi, who installed his father as the new overlord 
of Chuzan.75
                                                            
73 Ming taizu shilu juan 217, p. 3198. It was the biggest of all King Satto’s delegations to China in 
terms of scale and size. 
 Hashi continued to enlist Kumemura services and maintain the tributary 
relations with Ming China. Clearly, the Chuzan-Ryukyu kings saw it in their best interests 
to actively engage the Ming, but why? Was it for trade and economic concessions, as 
74 The castles, or castled villages, were known as gusuku グスク in the Ryukyuan script. King 
Satto and King Bunei located their seat of power at Urasoe castle. It was King Sho Hashi who 
shifted the power base to Shuri. 
75 Ming taizong shilu juan 66, p. 928. 
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what many scholars have maintained, or were there more pressing issues that Ryukyuan 
kings would need to resolve?76
Having no preconceived notions of “state”, “nation”, or even “kingship” to rely 
on, early kings sought alternatives to proclaim their royal authority and prerogatives. 
One of the alternatives, which I see as the main, was the shaping of the Ryukyuan king’s 
image to a Chinese-style Confucian sage. This was also the fundamental area in which 
the Kumemura elite would play a part in Ryukyuan society. The Ryukyuan king became a 
Confucian whose authority rested not on military prowess but on his virtuous character. 
He was also the benevolent power that united and sustained the archipelago, rendering 
no principal difference between him and the newfound kingdom. The primary goals of 
this royal endeavour were in large realized by the reign of King Sho Shin 尚真 (r. 1477-
1526), whose success in building a centralized political system could be attributed to the 
master narrative of his predecessors, who had shaped themselves as epitomes of the 
Confucian sage-kings. How was this narrative conveyed? 
 
Information on the lifestyles and characteristics of Ryukyuan kings, especially 
the early ones, has been dearth and patchy. Nevertheless, available materials are 
sufficient for us to draw a small, albeit not definitive, picture of the Ryukyuan kingship, 
with due emphasis on its early reigns. I argue that Ryukyuan kings had manipulated their 
links with the Ming to their political advantage, their activities intended for a domestic 
audience under their effective rule. The chapter should not be read as a history of the 
                                                            
76 Hashi and his father were bestowed upon the surname of “Sho” 尚, which means “in service of 
royal affairs” in classical Chinese. The Ming emperor viewed them as his imperial subjects, but 
this did not imply that he regarded the Ryukyu kingdom as Chinese territory. Hashi’s father, King 
Sho Shisho 尚思绍, was falsely claimed by Hashi to be King Bunei’s son to avoid being branded as 
a usurper. See Ming shi 明史 juan 323 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), p. 8363. 
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Ryukyuan kingship. Instead, the chapter interprets the Ryukyuan kingship as an event, 
subject to active contestations between various interest groups and political elites of 
the kingdom. The means and ways through which early Ryukyuan kings perceived and 
presented themselves were primarily determined by the dynamics of domestic politics. 
Royal consumption and practices were political projects of asserting “civilized” status 
and demonstrating the patronage of Chinese-Kumemura culture. 
 
Presentation and Representation of the Ryukyuan Kingship 
Documents relating to the consumption habits and patterns of the Ryukyuan 
kings and their court at Shuri are scarce. The background of Ryukyu’s royal consumption 
shall therefore be sketched with broad strokes and complemented by hypotheses and 
inferences. We should note that such consumption of things Chinese was maintained for 
both Ming and Ryukyuan consumption, especially the Shuri elite. 
Early Ryukyuan kings clearly indulged in forms of prestige consumption and 
ostentatious display. King Sho Hashi once ordered the planting of birch at Yasukuni Hill 
安国山 near Shuri castle in 1427. He was inspired by the report of a chief minister who 
had participated in a tributary mission to China during his father’s reign in 1417. In the 
report, the minister described China as a land where rites and culture were properly 
observed, and where high mountains and vast lakes abounded. Upon his return, the 
minister constructed a big pond at Yasukuni Hill, which became a scenic spot for both 
office-holders and commoners.77
                                                            
77 Higa Shuncho比嘉春潮, Shinko ̄ Okinawa no rekishi新稿沖繩の歴史 (History of Okinawa: 
New Edition) (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1970), p. 103. In Ryukyu, “the palace grounds were 
 The birch trees were an addition to the existing spot. 
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Ming envoys to Ryukyu also recorded the massive construction of landscape gardens on 
royal premises. Chen Kan 陈侃 (1489-1538) noted that Shuri castle was “built atop a hill 
… and surrounded by rocks. Outside of the main gate stood rock sculptures, below 
which a small stream was flowing. There was a stone fountain of dragon carving known 
as the ‘Lucky Fountain’ 瑞泉 that jetted water from the mouth into the stream.”78 Of 
special note to Chen’s account is that the Seiden (or Kokuden), the main hall of Shuri 
castle, stood facing west at China.79
Tributary missions to China constituted a major source of acquisition of luxury 
products for Ryukyu, a source supplemented by illicit trade and private smuggling 
banned by the Ming court. The Kumemura inhabitants were often selected by Shuri to 
fill the offices of tributary embassies, customs officials, and tax farmers. This pattern of 
commerce led to a considerable Chinese influence on royal taste, as reflected in the 
architectural and decorative styles of the realm. The arches and gates were of Chinese 
style. Xiao Chongye 萧崇业 (?-1588) once commented that the layout of enclosures in 
 This defied the Chinese architectural style that had 
defined most of the chambers and halls on Shuri grounds, which proposes that an ideal 
building should “sit north and face south” 坐北朝南. A possible reason for this was the 
deep admiration and respect held by the kings for China, and the castle’s structure was 
a manifestation of such mentality. The connection with the Ming enhanced the symbolic 
preeminence of Shuri castle as the realm’s exemplary centre, creating a space for the 
sacred ceremonies which will be discussed later. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
surrounded by finely-laid stone embankments and embellished with red-lacquered fencing about 
the royal park.” See Kerr, Okinawa, History of an Island People, p. 109. 
78 Chen Kan 陈侃, Shi Ryukyu roku使琉球錄 (Record of Ryukyu) (Ginowan: Yojusha, 1995), p. 
208. 
79 Ibid., p. 177. 
32 
 
Shuri castle was an imitation of Chinese palace architecture.80 In 1428, King Sho Hashi 
ordered the construction of Chuzanmon 中山门 and the hanging of a tablet reading 
“Chuzan” 中山 over the new gate.81 King Sho Sei 尚清 (r. 1527-1555) commanded the 
construction of a second gate to the main hall of Shuri called the Shuriemon 守礼门, 
hanging upon the completion of works a tablet inscribed with the words “Awaiting the 
Bearers of Wisdom” 待贤 over the archway.82
Besides building projects (and ritual performances), a major outlet of royal 
expenditure was the importation of luxury goods. Since the earliest investiture mission, 
the Ming had been providing the Chuzan and Ryukyu kings with the calendar, fine silks, 
and suits of clothing.
 However, the tablet was later switched to 
one that read “Shuri” 首里, a pun of the name of the gate at which it was hung. When 
Ming emissaries visited, the “Shuri” tablet would be replaced by one that read “The 
Land where Ritual Propriety is Observed” 守礼之邦, now restored on the original site at 
Shurijo Castle Park. These tablets were seen as testaments to the successful assimilation 
into the Chinese cultural order, one that emphasized propriety and rites. 
83
                                                            
80 See Xiao Chongye 萧崇业, Shi Liuqiu lu: fu huanghua changhe shi 使琉球录：附皇华唱和诗 
(Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 台湾学生书局, 1969), p. 112. 
 Although most of these items were conferred upon in the form 
of gifts, Ryukyu had to initiate the flow by dispatching tribute at its own expense. The 
high costs of entertaining and receiving Chinese investiture missions also devolved on 
81 Higa, Shinko ̄ Okinawa no rekishi, p. 104. The inscription was penned by Chai Shan 柴山, the 
Ming embassy who visited Ryukyu to invest King Sho Hashi from 1425 to 1434. 
82 Barry D. Steben, “The Transmission of Neo-Confucianism to the Ryukyu (Liuqiu) Islands and Its 
Historical Significance: Ritual and Rectification of Names in a Bipolar Authority Field”, Sino-
Japanese Studies 11, 1 (October 1998), p. 42. 
83 Ming taizu shilu juan 77, p. 1416-1417. He Fangchuan raises the point that the acceptance of 
the calendar symbolized that of Chinese cosmo-moral dominion and culture, much of which went 
into the calibration and formulation of the calendar through observance of nature and seasonal 
changes. See He, ““Huayi zhixu” lun”, p. 39. 
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royal coffers. Nonetheless, such spending was necessary to draw distinctions in 
consumption and secure royal authority. 
Chinese silks were transformed by local artisans into objects representative of 
royal status, or worn as ceremonial garments, in contrast with the hemp cultivated by 
most commoners to make their clothing.84 Ryukyuan kings ate rice, while most of their 
subjects at the subsistence base had barley, millet, and yam (薯, or sweet potato) for 
their staple. The royal demand for rice was largely met by the trade with Ayutthaya.85 
Rice was also used to produce wine for royal consumption, while the people made their 
wine out of sugarcane.86 At a royal banquet thrown in his honour, Chen Kan noted that 
“the Ryukyuans sat on mats and did not know of the different flavours and seasonings”, 
and although many dishes were served at the banquet, the Ryukyuans accomplished so 
by enlisting the help of cooks of the Ming mission.87 At a later banquet, Chen recorded 
that “there were fewer dishes and they were not as sumptuous as before”, and that 
“these dishes were whipped up by the concubines of the inner chambers.”88 Still, this 
offered a stark contrast to the simple fare of the main populace, who had to share small 
portions of meat and wine and owned very few drinking vessels.”89
                                                            
84 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, p. 215. 
 
85 This is suggested by archeological and excavation projects that are being executed in Okinawa. 
See Richard Pearson, “The Chuzan Kingdom of Okinawa as a City-State”, in Deborah L. Nichols 
and Thomas H. Charlton, eds., The Archeology of City-State: Cross-Cultural Approaches 
(Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), pp. 122-123. In fact, rice formed 
the bulk of the trade between Ryukyu and Ayutthaya. 
86 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, p. 214. See also Fei Xin 费信, Xing cha sheng lan 星槎胜览 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1954), p. 56. 
87 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, pp. 181-182. 
88 Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
89 Zhang Xueli 张学礼, Zhongshan jilue 中山纪略 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi 新文丰出版
公司, 1984), p. 11. 
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One pompous affair of the Ryukyuan king was the parade of his royal entourage 
through the busy streets of Naha. Chen Kan recounted that “the king sat in a sedan 
carried on shoulder by sixteen guards, and canopies of the five colours (purple, yellow, 
red, green, and blue) filled the procession. Drummers and trumpeters played ahead of 
the grand entourage of hundreds of escorts, who held spears and axes and marched 
behind the sedan. A pair of large fans decorated with pearls and bearing the shape of 
gourds was hoisted beside the sedan.”90
Chinese visitors to Ryukyu attested to the observance in the Ryukyuan court of 
sumptuary regulations prescribing the kind of dress befitting one’s social status and 
position. Common men of Ryukyu “wore their beards and did not wear any headdress. 
Instead, they bundled up their hair.”
 The procession proclaimed to all onlookers and 
participants that he owned the city and kingdom. Territorial ownership was marked by 
his physical presence and resonated by impression of the procession. 
91 Ming investiture missions to Ryukyu frequently 
brought with them silks and cloths of various designs, colours, and decorative patterns. 
Kings from Sho En to Sho Ho appeared in their portraits wearing robes sewn with gold 
embroidery, signaling a major restyling of royal attire. The Ming robes were an obvious 
example of invented tradition, one invented by the kings with Ming assistance. In an 
effort to codify and ritualize dress code as an expression of social status, King Sho Shin 
decreed that “the division of a hundred ranks be distinguished, in order of rank, by the 
colours of purple, yellow, red, green, and blue, which were to be sub-divided into the 
upper and lower ranks each.”92
                                                            
90 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, p. 220. 
 Hereafter, dress defined elite identity in Ryukyu. The 
decree was also an instance of indigenization or localization of Chinese practices. The 
91 Ibid., p. 203. 
92 Kyu ̄ yō 球阳 (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1974), article 2. 
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regal insignia delineated by colour was a Ryukyuan innovation, based loosely on Ming 
regulations of codifying dress in society.93
It is the contention of this thesis that the mixture of forces and interests that 
combined to Ryukyu’s strength through the first centuries of its existence is seen in the 
vicissitudes of its internal politics, the fluctuations of its foreign policy, and the form 
taken by its institutions. In each of these areas are revealed tensions and a potential for 
conflict that could have been eased and directed only by a creative and forceful kingship 
under the auspices of the Ming. The fashioning of the kingship in the image of the Ming 
emperor in particular and the Chinese in general was an appropriation of socio-cultural 
practices and material culture from China. Having convinced the Ming of its recognizably 
“civilized” image, early Ryukyuan kings could now set a historical pattern of “legitimacy” 
and receive Ming investitures on their soil. Ming imports acquired new meanings and 
nuances in Ryukyu, and sorting this out is the task of the following chapters. 
 Dress was a political instrument believed to 
transform behaviour. To early Ryukyuan kings, consumption was a means to imitate the 
Chinese, and to discourage interpersonal conflict and rationalize status differences. The 
Ryukyu kingdom’s special relations with the Ming in the form of distinguishable Chinese 
cultural influence and customs have been a source of a Ryukyuan (and now Okinawan) 
identity that marks differences from mainland Japan. 
 
 
                                                            
93 In Ming China, yellow was restricted to the use of the emperor. Red was the dynastic colour of 
the dynasty. High officials wore red robes, and lower ranks wore dark blue. Black was worn by 
imperial bodyguards and chief attendants to the emperor. See Valery M. Garrett, Chinese Dragon 
Robes (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3. 
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3. Rule by Ritual: The Ming Investitures 
 
Diplomatic Rituals 
Having set the stage for inquiry, let us now locate the intended audience of 
these practices and imagery. Royal consumption in Ryukyu was aimed primarily at the 
ajis, priestesses, and other political elites, who then viewed the king in light of the Ming 
emperor and the tributary system. The king, through his self-portrayals and different 
consumption modes, aligned himself with the desires and pretenses of the political 
elites, who must first perceive the Ming to be “civilized” before playing active roles to 
appropriate Chinese ideas and symbols to meet their own political objectives. 
Carefully orchestrated spectacles through Ming investitures of Ryukyuan kings 
served a vital purpose to the Shuri royalty: the binding of the king’s achievements to the 
kingdom he personified, the greatest of all being the establishment of cordial relations 
with the Ming. Each investiture confirmed his right to rule. Tomiyama studies the ritual 
connected with the investiture of Ryukyuan kings and raises the point that they were 
bestowed upon the rank of a Chinese junwang 郡王. According to Tomiyama, this was 
“a form of symbolic authority so powerful that if a king did not receive investiture, he 
could not be king.”94
                                                            
94 Quoted from Smits, Visions of Ryukyu, p. 41. The acceptance of the “junwang” title implies that 
the Ryukyuan king accepts as well the concept of universal Chinese sovereignty in the Confucian 
world order. 
 The link between investitures and royal authority remains absent, 
and the task is attempted by Maehira Fusaaki真栄平房昭, who argues that investitures 
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were group ceremonies that bore a heavy impact on the common people, who emerged 
to watch in great numbers.95
More needs to be said regarding how the Chinese investiture missions had 
bolstered the Ryukyuan king’s claim to power. Before the consolidation of royal power 
accomplished during King Sho Shin’s reign, the kingship had encountered great difficulty 




At the court overlooked by Seiden, guards bear flags of five 
colours, and incense tables and flowerpots are aligned in the 
auspicious direction of the New Year. At the sixth hour 巳刻, drums 
are beaten; ajis enter in a procession the Houshinmon 奉神门 into the 
square and stand behind the court officials, who are to perform 
prostration to the king with the ajis filling the left and right flanks. A 
royal henchman reads the king’s greetings for the New Year, and the 
 Early Ryukyuan kings counteracted the pressures by emphasizing 
Confucian values, which stressed the centrality and sanctity of the kingship. Ritual and 
hierarchical observance became important, and the kingship stressed the importance of 
ceremonies that created symbolic links between them and the political elite, an instance 
of which being the royal celebration of New Year’s Day. According to Ryukyuan records, 
New Year’s Day was an elaborate affair: 
                                                            
95 Fusaaki, “Ryūkyū no kaigai jōhō to Higashi Ajia: jūkyū seiki no Chūgoku jōsei o megutte,” in 
Iwashita Tetsunori 岩下哲典 and Maehira Fusaaki, eds., Kinsei Nihon no kaigai jōhō 近世日本の
海外情報 (Iwata Shoin, 1997), pp. 95-109. 
96 Even during the reign of King Sho Shin, to whom the accomplishments of forcing the ajis to 
reside at Shuri and sending officials to keep a close watch on aji lands could be credited, the 
priestesses still wielded immense power. This is illustrated by the following shaman song: In the 
trance place of shining sun, the great shamans pray, rubbing their palms, present tribute to Sho 
Shin, king helped by his mother, in the trance place of Sonto, the lordly shamans pray, rubbing 




king appears at the main palace upon his completion. Concubines offer 
incense at the altars, and all officials bow to the king.97
 
 
The paraphernalia and symbolism fed the imagination of the ceremony’s onlookers and 
participants. As prescribed modes of established routine, such rituals acted to reinforce 
and sustain the imagination. One thematic concern in these rituals was the glorification 
of kingly power. On New Year’s Day, the impression was made that the king had blessed 
the kingdom by his very existence over the past year, and the assurance that the king 
would function so in the next was reiterated in this proclamation. The ceremony was a 
symbolic representation, as well as the king’s impression, of Ryukyu’s social organization 
emphasizing hierarchy, etiquette, and status.98
In Ronald P. Toby’s words, diplomatic protocol and diplomatic language “are 
nothing if they are not a highly formalized, stylized set of symbols by which states 
attempt to represent the “order” between and among themselves”.
 
99
                                                            
97 Harada Nobuo, Yakuchu ̄  Ryūkyūkoku kyūki訳注琉球國旧記 (Ginowan: Yoju Shorin, 2005), p. 
11. 
 Diplomatic rituals 
constitute a formal system of practice and language perceived by both observers and 
participants to be reflective of practical concerns and political relationships. Ryukyuan 
kings had always welcomed Ming investiture missions, as long as it was within their 
financial means to hold the conspicuous and elaborate ceremonies and host the Chinese 
embassies for months. The expenses of diplomatic rituals were high, but the successful 
performance of majestic spectacles on vast open spaces was a potent expression of 
98 Xie Bizhen contends that Ryukyuan kings would attend and preside over all major ceremonies 
and rituals in the kingdom, all in a bid to uphold Confucian values for Ryukyuan consumption. See 
Xie, “Laihua Liuqiu liuxuesheng yu ruxue zai Liuqiu de chuanbo” 来华琉球留学生与儒学在琉球
的传播, in Rujia wenming yu Zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi 儒家文明与中国传统对外关
系, ed. Chen Shangsheng (Jinan: Shandong University Press, 2008), p. 278. 
99 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 168. 
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civilization, something that Ryukyuan kings utilized to appeal to the Chinese externally, 
and impress their subjects and other political elites internally. Diplomatic rituals were 
physical manifestations of the king’s symbolic power, translated into tangible resources 
that the king could muster to hold them. Aimed at impressing all observers through the 
display of Ryukyu’s “civilizational progress” and “material wealth”, the king’s reception 
of his Ming investiture was inherently a ritual of both congratulation (the ascension of a 
“legitimate” successor to the throne) and self-congratulation (the celebration of royal 
power and renewal of Ming-Ryukyuan links). 
 
Ming Investitures of Ryukyuan Kings 
Ming embassies were first received at Naha, where they would disembark and 
be invited to the “Pavilion of Welcoming Favour” 迎恩亭 to rest, before being ushered 
into the “Quarters of the Emissary of Heaven” 天使馆 where they would reside for the 
duration of their stay in Ryukyu. The leader of the Chinese mission was known as the 
“Emissary of Heaven” 天使, showing the conceptual nature of the tributary relationship. 
The emissary would be led to the royal ancestral temple, where tablets dedicated to the 
souls of previous kings were venerated, and it was expected of the emissary to pay his 
offerings and respect to the king’s deceased ancestors. He was to declaim the Ming 
elegiac addressed to the immediate preceding king, usually in praise of the deceased 
king’s “civilized” acts and observance of the Confucian order when he was alive. It was 
only upon the completion of these rituals that the investiture of the successor would 
commence. On the investiture day, the king would lead his royal entourage to receive 
the emissary at the Chuzan gate and see the Ming mission to the royal court 御庭, at 
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which centre the emissary would stand and read aloud the investiture edict of the Ming 
emperor. The king would prostrate before the emissary and receive the imperial decree 
from him, with Chinese music as the backdrop.100
Before his investiture, the king could only be referred to as the heir-apparent 世
子.
 
101 The Ming investiture edict was proof of imperial favour and a source of political 
legitimacy for the king, who would request to keep the edict as a royal possession. More 
importantly, the edict served as a testament to the Ming endorsement of the king’s 
“civilized” deeds and political power, all of which were explained in Confucian terms. Of 
note is that the diplomatic rituals involved were not entirely those of subservience, as 
an important prerequisite to fulfill before any investiture could commence was the Ming 
emissary’s visit and honour of the king’s highly respected ancestors. The king could 
refuse to receive the Ming contingent at the Naha port, citing that there was no such 
precedent and that he did not have the intention to violate past practices.102
                                                            
100 The diplomatic and investiture rituals described here follows the encounters and experiences 
of Chen Kan, who was dispatched to invest King Sho Shin. Later investitures did not differ much 
from these procedures. See Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, pp. 174-183. Xu Yuhu has done much work on 
Ming investiture of Ryukyuan kings. See Xu, Mingdai Liuqiu wangguo duiwai guanxi zhi yanjiu, 
pp. 585-608. 
 Other 
causes of political dispute included the trading practices of Ming emissaries in Ryukyu. A 
prime example of such dispute was seen in 1579 when the Ming emissary Xie Jie 谢杰 
(1537-1604) arrived to invest King Sho Ei 尚永 (r. 1573-1586). Xie had headbands to sell, 
but the Ryukyuan layperson wore no headdress and sales became difficult. Reasoning 
that the “civilized” Chinese wore crowns and belts 冠带, Xie contended that it would be 
inappropriate for Ryukyuan officials not to wear them during the investiture, and that 
101 This practice had its origins in the recognition and investiture of early kings, such as King Satto 
and King Sho Hashi. See Ming shi juan 323, p. 8363. 
102 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, pp. 174-175. 
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he would refuse to conduct the ceremony if this requirement was not met. As a result, 
Xie’s headbands were sold out; Ming emissaries earned themselves such reputation as 
aggressive traders that the Ryukyuan king would make a quick exit from the investiture 
once it was over for fear of “being coerced into making more purchases.”103
But there was more to Xie’s story than meets the eye. In Xie’s own accounts, he 




The strict adherence to diplomatic protocol and rituals required by Ming 
emissaries did not deter the Ryukyuan kings from seeking political legitimacy from the 
Ming emperor. At times, however, the high material cost involved in the realization of 
the investiture was a financial burden and matter of concern in the Ryukyuan kingship, 
which was already suffering from resource scarcity attributed to its limited rule over the 
 This is perplexing: was Xie a mercenary repugnant to diplomatic courtesy, or 
was he an upright ambassador oblivious to the temptations of money? The Qing source 
that had documented the event univocally saw it in Xie’s negative light and approached 
it from an economic standpoint. But in Xie’s view, his mission was to invest the king in 
the most ritually appropriate manner possible. Ming emissaries were entrusted by their 
emperor with the task of “civilizing the margins” with their words and deeds, as well as 
through the proper execution of the investiture. Preposterous and blatant it would be 
for Xie to attempt meeting his selfish ends without any fear of repercussions. Therefore, 
the perplexity lies not in Xie’s actions, but in the perspective that was adopted. To Xie, 
economic motivations were secondary to the conduct of the investiture. 
                                                            
103 Shen Defu 沈德符, Wanli yehuo bian 万历野获编 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), p. 781. 
104 Fang Baochuan 方宝川, “Textual Researching on Xie Jie and his Works” 谢杰及其著作考略, 
Journal of Fujian Normal University 155, 2 (2009), p. 126. 
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archipelago. There was no record of how much it cost Ryukyu to hold an investiture and 
host a Ming embassy, but it is not hard to infer from the list of elaborate items involved 
and the more detailed Qing writings that the Ryukyuan expenditure must have been 
immense.105 It comes hardly as a surprise that the kings, much as they craved for the 
show of support from the Ming, would not request for investiture missions “unless they 
had saved up for more than ten years.”106
Past [Chinese] embassies travelled to Ryukyu and could not 
return before winds of the tenth month blew. They held many goods 
for sale at high prices, and try as they might the Ryukyuans could not 
afford them all. Fearing that this might displeasure the embassies, the 
Ryukyuans did everything possible to delay them from leaving [until 
they could buy up the goods].




Despite this, the Ryukyuan kings insisted on inviting the embassies over for investiture. 
It was the Ming resolve that began to waver. 
When King Sho Nei 尚宁 (r. 1587-1620) requested for investiture, the Ming 
court debated on whether it was economically viable and sensible to send a mission to 
Ryukyu, considering the high costs to be incurred in organizing one, and the high risks 
involved due to possible pirate attacks. The ministers came to the consensus that they 
should “either assign an emissary to Fujian to read and bestow the imperial edict upon 
                                                            
105 The reports and travelogues of Ming emissaries offer comprehensive lists of the luxury items 
involved in the proper conduct of the investiture and the consumption of their embassies during 
their residence in Ryukyu. There are no exact figures of the cost of Ming investitures on Ryukyu. 
A Qing estimate of Ryukyuan spending on a particular Ming investiture stood at 320,000 taels of 
silver. See Su Zhicheng 苏志诚, Ribing Liuqiu yu Zhong Ri Liuan jiaoshe 日并琉球与中日琉案交
涉 (M.A. dissertation, National Taiwan Normal University, 1983), p. 13. 
106 Xie Zhaozhe 谢肇淛, Wu za zu 五杂组 (Taipei: Weiwen tushu chubanshe 伟文图书出版社, 
1977), p. 111. 
107 Li Dingyuan 李鼎元, Shi Liuqiu lu 使琉球录 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1975), p. 177. 
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the Ryukyuan envoy, or dispatch a military official with a small entourage to Ryukyu to 
execute the ritual,” and the Ming emperor chose the second option. But King Sho Nei 
refused to accept the arrangement, insisting that the Ming emperor should “observe the 
old practice of dispatching a proper embassy,” and that he should “send a civil official” 
to Ryukyu instead. The Ming emperor eventually obliged after numerous appeals.108 
This episode suitably dispels the myth that Ryukyu’s participation in the tributary system 
was a pursuit of trading privileges and economic benefits. The profits received from 
tributary trade were obviously inadequate to cover the costs of holding the investiture, 
hosting the embassy, and procuring the goods brought over by the mission. Special note 
should be taken that the Ryukyuan king regarded his emissary in China as his 
representative, and allowed him to wear Ming robes embroidered with dragon designs 
for his tributary mission to Beijing.109
In fact, I would argue that Ryukyu was diligent and frequent in sending tribute 
to the Ming in order to offset the high costs of the investitures conducted on its soil. The 
tributary missions were also a vital source of revenue to pay for the royal purchase and 
consumption of luxury goods. When the Ming embassy disembarked at Naha, hundreds 
of Ryukyuan officials and their followers would prostrate upon seeing the imperial edict 
and greet the embassy in their finest robes. The Ryukyuan procession would then lead 
the Ming emissary from the harbour to his designated residence near Shuri castle. It 
must have been a spectacular sight: the reception of the Ming embassy was performed 
at the Naha port where merchants from far-flung areas could witness the arrival of the 
 King Sho Nei’s rejection of the Ming’s alternative 
arrangements aptly showed how much he had valued the investiture for its own sake. 
                                                            
108 Ming shi juan 323, pp. 8368-8369. 
109 Schuyler Cammann, China’s Dragon Robes (New York: Ronald Press, 1952), pp. 157-158. 
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“Emissary of Heaven” and his impressive mission in Ryukyu; the Chinese-Ryukyuan 
entourage of hundreds moved through the streets of the Naha-Shuri complex where the 
majority of Ryukyu’s population dwelt; and the grand finale of the investiture during 
which loud but breathtaking ceremonial music was played to the ears of all within and 
near Shuri. The accessories, costumes, and headgears worn by the Ming envoys should 
not appear foreign to the Ryukyuan natives. The king, a protégé of the Ming emperor, 
had long familiarized his subjects with all things Chinese via his consumption habits and 
patterns. The last act, the investiture, confirmed the king’s reputation as a “civilized” 
monarch, who could enjoy the blessings of the “Celestial Court”. It is no surprise that a 
massive Ryukyuan crowd would gather: they had paid much for the act. 
 
The Chinese World Order: A Ritual Order 
In 2009 at the Redondo Beach Performing Arts Center of California in the United 
States, the musical King Sho Hashi: Dynamic Ryukyu was performed. King Sho Hashi was 
portrayed as “an iconic figure in Okinawan history” whose great accomplishments had 
“contributed to the prosperity of his country, both financially and systematically.” The 
tagline read “His vision united a kingdom” and the musical played that it was under King 
Sho Hashi that the peasants became united as one and that the Ryukyu Islands began to 
enjoy a significant presence in the region.110
                                                            
110 A detailed description of the musical is offered in “King Sho Hashi: Dynamic Ryukyu”, Okinawa 
Association of America <
 While the musical might not have been a 
historically accurate depiction of King Sho Hashi, it did sketch the glory and prosperity of 
Ryukyu during the reign of its early king(s). Significant political accomplishments of King 
http://www.oaamensore.org/100/musical_overview.html>, July 2010. 
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Sho Hashi included the unification of Ryukyu under one kingship, and the maintenance 
and strengthening of relations with the Ming. 
The Omoro Soshi, the equivalent of the Chinese Book of Songs 诗经, offers a 
wealth of evidence for early solar worship in the rural population at the periphery of the 
Shuri centre.111 King Satto “beseeched to be conferred upon titles and robes that his 
subjects could admire in order to change their barbaric ways.”112 Later King Sho Hashi 
would “request for the ceremonial robes that were not granted during his investiture” 
and desired nothing else.113 These pioneering efforts allowed King Sho Shin, whose reign 
has been hailed as “the Great Days of Chuzan”, to reorganize religious life to enhance 
royal power and appoint his sister as high priestess to institutionalize the onarigami 
belief under the firm control of Shuri.114 Without the accomplishments of his ancestors, 
King Sho Shin might not have succeeded in creating the tedako ideology, the idea of king 
as a descendant of the sun.115
Conventional wisdom holds that there was a “Sinicization” or “Japanization” of 
Ryukyu during its existence as an independent kingdom. It is neither the concern nor in 
the interest of this chapter to ascertain which was so in Ryukyu. Rather, I contend that 
 While the Ryukyuan ideology was modeled after Chinese 
conceptions of heaven and moral authority, it does not imply that “Sinicization” existed 
in Ryukyu to replace indigenous traditions. 
                                                            
111 See Sakima, "Omoro" no shiso and Sakihara Mitsugu, A Brief History of Early Okinawa Based 
on the Omoro Soshi (Tokyo: Honpo Shoseki Press, 1987). The object of this solar worship was the 
sun that rose in the east, not the sun in its totality. It is interesting to note that Sakima uses his 
study to show the Japanese lineage of Okinawan language. 
112 Ming taizu shilu juan 217, p. 3198. 
113 Ming xuanzong shilu 明宣宗实录 juan 15 (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia 
Sinica, 1966), p. 414. 
114 Takara Kurayoshi, Ryukyu no jidai: o ̄ i naru rekishizōo motomete琉球の時代: 大いなる歴史
像を求めて (The Era of Okinawa: In Search of a Macro-Historical Outlook) (Naha: Hiru Gi Sha, 
1989), pp. 199-224. 
115 Smits, “Ambiguous Boundaries”, p. 99. 
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traditional cultural flows had to be predated and led by changes in the consumption 
modes of royal elites, of which political dynamics were a main cause. In Ryukyu, the king 
and his Shuri associates played active roles in the appropriation and localization of ideas 
and practices of the Ming. The Ryukyuan king modestly placed the Ming emperor at the 
apex of the Confucian cultural and moral order, expressing this view in his tributary 
missions and written petitions to the Chinese court for investiture and propagating it to 
his subjects by his actions and behaviour. The development of an infant bureaucracy in 
the service of the king demanded the education of the elites and an army of officials and 
juniors to staff it. New career prospects and trading opportunities persuaded both elites 
and commoners to pursue education as and when they could afford it. 
Chen Kan recorded that in Ryukyu “sons of officials and the most talented of the 
populace were ordered to study the Chinese classics to prepare themselves for official 
posts and interpreting tasks in the future” in schools.116 The king, imaged as a Confucian 
sage-king exemplified in portraits and personal consumption, was the patron of the 
students and bureaucrats. Sons of ajis were sent to the Ming for Confucian education, 
returning to promote the education that had refashioned them into able administrators 
loyal to the king. Confucian learning became a prerequisite to securing bureaucratic 
positions and substantial profits from the China trade.117
Confucian values became so embedded in the psyche of the Ryukyuan official 
that they were used to judge the moral standards and authority of the king. After the 
mysterious death of King Sho Toku 尚德 (r. 1461-1469), an aji came to power and 
 
                                                            
116 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, pp. 214-215. 
117 King Satto dispatched the very first batch of Ryukyuan students to China in 1392. See Ming 
taizu shilu juan 217, p. 3197. 
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established the Second Sho Dynasty, assuming the royal surname and reign of Sho and 
ruling as King Sho En 尚圆 (r. 1470-1476).118 Hereafter, Ryukyuan historians and officials 
condemned King Sho Toku, who was described as a tyrant who would “quibble and kill 
the common folk wantonly” and had indulged in evil excesses, which displayed a lack of 
governing virtue. In stark contrast, they praised the second founder, who “disciplined 
himself by high moral standards, treated his subjects in a benevolent manner, and 
viewed the people as his children.”119
The intended audience of Ryukyuan royal rituals was the political elites: ajis, 
priestesses, and Kumemura, amongst others. The royal appropriation of Ming symbols 
and execution of Chinese practices was aimed at gaining political leverage over other 
powerful elites. Shuri was the manifestation of royal authority and such was its political 
function. The castle’s nuclear facilities, the seiden (palace) and the una (plaza), filled the 
landscape of a ritual site meant to impress, both literally and figuratively. Royal rituals 
manifested the purportedly divine nature of Ryukyuan kings, who were first appointed 
vassals of the “Son of Heaven” of the Ming and later, descendants of the sun in the 
tedako ideology. Early Ryukyuan kings had nothing to learn from the Chinese on how to 
cast a semi-divine image of themselves by means of their sartorially enhanced personae, 
material possessions, and physical setting of their castles and courts. The Ming imperial 
model was not used to supplant but to counteract the indigenous influences that had 
threatened the kingship. Ryukyu could be likened to the archetypal Balinese principality 
 While the records should never be read at face 
value, they show how pervasive Confucian values had become in Ryukyuan elite society 
and historiography, which promoted the value of ritual propriety. 
                                                            
118 Legitimacy is a virtue in the Confucian rectification of names. 
119 Kyu ̄ yō, article 123. 
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that Clifford Geertz has famously termed as the “theatre state”, one that had privileged 
the capacity of pomp, drama, and display to order human affairs.120 Geertz proposes 
that ceremony puts people in their places, particularly in relation to divinity, and hence 
orders their existence.121
To Ryukyuan kings, diplomatic rituals and protocol were not by-products of the 
wider process of the tributary system or trade. Trade was important, as is often blithely 
assumed in current scholarship, but Ryukyu was a ritual-centric kingdom in a Sinocentric 
world order with its kings bent to rule. A cultural gulf in the form of Confucian education 
protected the royalty against challenges by predominantly illiterate commoners and 
their local overlords, and the kingship exemplified this gulf via consumption habits and 
patterns. The Ming investitures were themselves a form of conspicuous, ostentatious 
consumption aimed at both differentiation and bonding, in the Confucian ideal of ritual 
propriety characterized by rites 礼 and music 乐. Language, regalia, and especially ritual 
all formed part of the arsenal of royal prestige in Ryukyu. 
 By means of the Ming investitures, Ryukyu was incorporated 
ritually, rather than administratively. Religious institutions of the old guard tended to 
compress or obviate royal authority and administration, and its kings had to undermine 
them by offering new incentives and directives. 
Diplomatic relations were rendered concrete through ritual. Political spectacles 
served the kingship’s principal goals of establishing authority over a newly bounded 
kingdom and uplifting prestige in the “Chinese world order” of the Ming and its tributary 
polities. The “Chinese world order” was in essence a ritual order, one that fed first on 
                                                            
120 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). Geertz, however, contends that “power served pomp, not pomp power”, 
instead of mass ritual serving as a device for the enactment of power (pp. 18-19). 
121 Craig J. Reynolds, Seditious Histories: Contesting Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2006), p. 44. 
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political aspirations and then on economic motivations. Investitures, as a form of ritual, 
articulated with remarkable precision the concept that royal subjects, segregated into 
orders by birth, were united as one people in the person of the king. As one scholar puts 
it, “ritual was the highest form of action or performance; every significant life event, 
social, political, or religious, was embedded in and expressed through ritual”.122
To recapitulate, consumption patterns and the Ming investitures of Ryukyuan 
kings were obvious signs of royal wealth in a programme of public and pious works. The 
Ryukyuan kingship provided a transcendent symbol with which all in the kingdom could 
identify. An anthropologist delineates sacred kingship as “a symbolic device, an illusory 
mechanism of production with the capacity to drive economic development.”
 A tablet 
that read “the Land where Ritual Propriety is Observed” would be hung at the Chuzan 
gate during the investiture, showing explicitly how the king had associated himself with 
the “civilized” Ming through his actions and submission. It was the king’s self-appointed 
task to ensure that order was maintained and ritual propriety made to reign. 
123
                                                            
122 David Johnson, Spectacle and Sacrifice: The Ritual Foundations of Village Life in North China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 8. 
 It is the 
task of the next chapter to elucidate why regionalism was important to the formation of 
the Ryukyu kingdom and how Ryukyu had extended trade to the Ming and beyond. With 
political power being consolidated in the hands of the kingship, Ryukyu was prepared to 
engage and benefit from the “Chinese world order” of politics and trade. As we would 
soon see, Ryukyuan kings, possessing monopolistic controls over trade and direct access 
to courts and markets, gained increasing wealth and could overawe both domestic and 
neighbouring rivals, improving in circular fashion their ability to trade. 
123 Luc de Heusch, “The Symbolic Mechanisms of Sacred Kingship: Rediscovering Frazer”, The 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 3, 2 (1997), p. 231. 
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4. In the Name of the Ming Emperor 
 
The Making of a Region 
We have seen in the Ryukyu kingdom how power was ritualized as a means of 
naturalizing the kingship through the mechanism of tribute-investiture relations with 
Ming China. Diplomatic rituals were solemn and repetitive practices connecting their 
participants. They were abstract and symbolic enough to expose themselves to different 
interpretations, having provided the symbolic and intellectual materials out of which the 
participants could construct their ideas about the world and identity in it. 
This chapter situates Ryukyu in the context of regional dynamics in search of its 
identity as a kingdom. But before we proceed further, it may be reasonable to ask: what 
defines a region? Why do we need to discuss identity in the regional context, especially 
in the case of the Ryukyu kingdom? 
Many scholars identify East Asia as a region with societies sharing a Confucian 
heritage.124
                                                            
124 See John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); and Gilbert Rozman, “Introduction: The East 
Asian Region in Comparative Perspective”, in The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and its 
Modern Adaptation The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and its Modern Adaptation, ed. 
Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 3-42. 
 Gilbert Rozman cites the Confucian intellectual tradition to stress distinctive 
and common features of development in East Asia. This focus, however, ignores the 
irrelevance of Confucianism to the historical trajectory of regions we call Inner Asia and 
Southeast Asia, where the influence was weak, as well as “the great differences in the 
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nature and degree of penetration of Confucianism even in the societies on which it did 
make an impact.”125
On the other hand, Hamashita defines the boundaries of the East Asian region 
primarily by “the indigenous, China-centred inter-state system that was in place long 
before European governmental and business organizations became significant players in 
the region.”
 Viewed in this light, both Inner Asia and Southeast Asia, especially 
the latter, are dismissed as mere appendages of “higher” civilizations. 
126 Hamashita examines East Asia as a region that is historically constituted 
with its own hegemonic, Sinocentric structure.127 To him, East Asia was politically and 
economically driven and interconnected by the Sinocentric tributary system, “sustained 
by a hierarchical order defined by the Confucian conception of a ‘rule of virtue.’”128
                                                            
125 Giovanni Arrighi, Hamashita Takeshi and Mark Selden, “The rise of East Asia in regional and 
world historical perspective”, in The Resurgence of East Asia, p. 4. Except for the Red River Delta, 
other parts of Southeast Asia did not adopt the Chinese writing system and Confucian culture to 
warrant them entry into the Chinese sphere of influence. See He Shengda贺圣达, “Dongya 
wenhuaquan he Dongya jiazhiguan de lishi kaocha” 东亚文化圈和东亚价值观的历史考察, in 
Wu Zhimo吴志摩, Li Yu李玉, and Bao Maohong包茂红, eds., Dongya de jiazhi 东亚的价值 
(Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010), pp. 34-36. 
 The 
association of the tributary system with the “Chinese world order” can be explained by 
the fact that, for centuries, the Europeans who sought to trade in China had to agree on 
tribute as a prerequisite. The “Chinese world order” was therefore a product of the 
Orientalist gaze on China and East Asia. The paradigm remains an influential and popular 
approach to understanding East Asia, despite its inherent flaws. One is its Sinocentrism, 
adopting the view of the Chinese court at the expense of that of the tributary polities. 
126 Ibid., p. 5. 
127 Hamashita, “The Intra-regional System in East Asia in Modern Times”, p. 113. 
128 Hamashita Takeshi, “Tribute and treaties: Maritime Asia and treaty port networks in the era of 
negotiation, 1800-1900”, in The Resurgence of East Asia, pp. 17-50. Chang Chi-Hsiung expounds a 
similar view by claiming that the “Chinese world empire” was a classical, precolonial form of the 
contemporary East Asian community comprising the nation-states of China, Japan, and Korea. 
See Chang Chi-Hsiung, “Zhonghua shijie zhixu yuanli de yuanqi: jindai Zhongguo waijiao fenzheng 
zhong de gudian wenhua jiazhi”中华世界秩序原理的源起：近代中国外交纷争中的古典文化
价值, in Dongya de jiazhi, p. 107. 
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Another is that it ignores certain aspects of China’s foreign relations such as warfare and 
inter-marriage, with a bias towards trade and diplomatic ceremonies.129
This recent wave of studies defines East Asia as a region of interdependencies, 
linked by economic and political activities rather than commonalities.
 
130 Duara sees 
China “less as a self-contained entity, a ‘geobody’, than as part of a broader set of global 
and regional processes.” The historical, regional nexus or web of interconnections and 
interdependencies was significant to the modern nation-states of China, Japan, and 
Korea, but these nation-states “tend to overlook the ways in which they are, in fact, the 
product of foreign ideas and practices.”131 A shift from the state-building or nation-state 
perspective to an overdue emphasis on the complexity and heterogeneity of identity 
and nationalism in East Asia is possible with the regional dynamic, which is “something 
more than and different from the sum of the separate national dynamics. In numerous 
ways, this regional dynamic has constrained, driven and shaped the development of the 
region’s economics, politics and societies over a long historical time.”132
Taking off from this rich corpus of literature on the definition of the East Asian 
region, I propose to see East Asia as a region that has been based on interconnections 
and interdependencies, but in the context of multiple political centres other than China. 
Many Chinese tributaries did not qualify as a state by most definitions, and depended 
on indigenous systems to rule and interact with one another. These polities entered into 
 
                                                            
129 Alexander L. Vuving, “Operated by World Views and Interfaced by World Orders: Traditional 
and Modern Sino-Vietnamese Relations”, in Negotiating Asymmetry, p. 77. 
130 Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden, “The rise of East Asia in regional and world historical 
perspective”, pp. 1-16. 
131 Prasenjit Duara, The Global and Regional in China’s Nation-Formation (New York: Routledge, 
2009), pp. 1, 5-6, 28. Thongchai Winichakul invents the concept “geobody”. See Winichakul, Siam 
Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
132 Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden, “The rise of East Asia in regional and world historical 
perspective”, p. 10. 
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political and trading relations without necessarily modeling their structures after the 
Chinese. Based on Chinese records and writings, however, the early East Asian world 
preserved a façade of hierarchical decorum based on the centrality and superiority of 
imperial China, seen by an earlier generation of scholars as the “Chinese world order”. 
Little has been said that precolonial East Asia actually practiced a horizontal, vibrant, 
and multicultural order in which relationships were established on the basis of mutual 
respect, economic motivations, and political rituals. 
This chapter argues that the Ryukyuan kingship saw the kingdom as a culturally 
distinct and peaceful bridge to the East Asian region, enjoying a rich, independent, and 
cosmopolitan experience in a mesh of interdependencies with other polities including 
the Ming. The importance of political theatre and trading relations in strengthening the 
social order to the identity of Ryukyu allowed the kingdom to be categorized with other 
polities into a region we define as East Asia. Indeed, Ryukyu prided itself as a “bridge 
between myriad lands” as inscribed on the giant bronze bell hung at Shuri in 1458. My 
position is close to the argument brought forth by Gan Huai-chen 甘怀真, who argues 
that the Chinese tributary system was a process of gift-and-acceptance of nomenclature 
and titles between the emperor and his vassals, on a ritual basis that was characterized 
by the exchange of symbols to signify power relations.133
                                                            
133 Gan, Huangquan, liyi yu jingdian quanshi, p. 365. 
 I elaborate on Gan’s argument 
by regarding geographical concepts and spatial relationships as a state of mind, subject 
to constant dynamics and constantly in the process of being made and remade. Identity 
is a discourse, one that is a site of hegemony, contestation, negotiation, and other kinds 
of resistance from both within and without. 
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This chapter is divided in the following sections: the power of trade, in the name 
of the Ming emperor, Ryukyu among equals, and the Ryukyu kingdom in a sea of 
interdependencies. It sees the Ryukyu network as one that had made the categorization 
of an East Asian region possible. In a broad sense, East Asia comprises both Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia on the basis of intertwining links and overlapping networks. This 
definition could help dispel the “China threat” in rhetoric by focusing our attention on 
lands and peoples far beyond the contemporary political confines of China (and Japan), 
without the clear demarcation of a hegemonic centre. Trade enables both cultural and 
political exchanges by transmitting the paraphernalia of material culture and ritual. It is 
in this context of foreign relations that Ryukyu’s conception of a Ryukyuan identity was 
enacted and articulated, in reference to Chinese criteria. 
 
The Power of Trade 
The Ming factor was crucial to the power of trade in Ryukyu. A Ming text writes, 
“with tribute comes trade; there would be no trade without tribute.”134
                                                            
134 Wang Qi 王圻, Xu wenxian tongkao 续文献通考 juan 31 (Jinan: Qilu shushe chubanshe 齐鲁
书社出版社, 1997), p. 474. 
 The tributary 
system of the Ming was one of a kind in the history of China. Uniquely systematized and 
bureaucratized, it prohibited private, maritime trade without at least a pretense of 
tribute, and with hindsight the Zheng He 郑和 voyages are “best seen as an anomalous 
state-directed revival within the framework of the tribute system of Song-Yuan positive 
attitudes toward maritime trade; the end of these official expeditions and the ban of 
private Chinese voyages left a sharply reduced Chinese maritime presence in Southeast 
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Asia.”135 It would be difficult to believe that Ryukyu was unaffected by these events. The 
Ryukyuans benefitted from the Ming maritime ban and hostile Sino-Japanese relations, 
becoming intermediaries between the Ming and the Japanese, and trading with polities 
in the Ming orbit. Even before the Zheng He voyages, Ryukyu was one of the few polities 
that paid tribute to the emperor in Nanjing on a regular basis.136
When the Ryukyuan polities were initially incorporated into the Ming imperial 
system as vassals, the focus or interest was primarily on utilitarian goods. An early Ming 
mission to the Ryukyus to buy horses noted that the local people “desire not fine silks 
but porcelain and iron cauldrons.”
 
137 Indeed, the Ming often traded silk, porcelain, and 
iron products for Ryukyuan horses and sulphur. Sakihara Mitsugu brings attention to the 
role that both Ryukyuan kings and local ajis played in the distribution of iron agricultural 
implements purchased from the Japanese and other foreign merchants.138 Early kings, 
such as King Satto and King Sho Hashi, were particularly known for such activities. Iron 
foundries and artefacts have been excavated from early gusuku sites,139
                                                            
135 John E. Wills, Jr., “Relations with maritime Europeans”, in Frederick W. Mote and Denis 
Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 8: The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, Part II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 393-394. 
 suggesting the 
importance of iron to Ryukyuan power politics. The strong demand of the Ryukyuan 
political elite for iron implements indicates that few ores or iron slabs were available on 
the main island, and the establishment of links with the Ming imperial court provided 
the Chuzan-Ryukyu kings with an abundant and significant source of iron which could be 
used to meet political ends and elicit support. 
136 The other polities were Annam 安南, Champa 占城, Chenla 真腊, and Siam 暹罗. From Ming 
taizu shilu juan 254, p. 3671. 
137 Ming taizu shilu juan 105, p. 1754. 
138 Sakihara, A brief history of early Okinawa, p. 144. 
139 Pearson, “The Chuzan Kingdom of Okinawa as a City-State”, pp. 124-125. 
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By the 1400s, there was a distinct shift in consumer demand from Ryukyu. It 
was a shift from utilitarian to luxury goods. While this should not be interpreted as an 
indication of a general increase in Ryukyu’s finances, it does suggest that tributary trade 
contributed to royal coffers, as much consumption of these luxury goods concerned only 
the king and his nobles as elaborated on in previous chapters. Prior to the 1370s, when 
Ryukyu first established diplomatic and official trading relations with Ming China, trade 
with China was primarily in soapstone cooking vessels and iron cauldrons, ceramics and 
porcelain.140 These practical items were gradually replaced by the fine silks in which the 
king and his political elites were clad, and paper money and copper coins.141
The trade with China became a royal monopoly, complemented by the Ming 
maritime prohibition on private trade. Shunzo Sakamaki claims that Shuri had assumed 
control of exacting tribute from the powerful ajis in outlying areas,
 
142 but archaeological 
assemblages have suggested that many local centres had their individual supplies of fine 
ceramics, which were attained outside of the official tributary trade.143
                                                            
140 Ming taizu shilu juan 105, p. 1754. Archaeological findings have shown that shell exchange 
and trade in the Ryukyus and East Asia had already existed before the establishment of Ming 
tributary relations, and trade ceramics and wares have been unearthed to substantiate earlier 
findings. This means that Ryukyu was not isolated from the outside world prior to its official 
interactions with Ming China, and that the archipelago had long been a part of the maritime 
trading network of East Asia. See Kinoshita Naoko, “Shell Exchange in the Ryukyu Islands and in 
East Asia” and Shinzato Akito, “Kamuiyaki and Early Trade in the Ryukyu Islands”, both in 
Okinawa: The Rise of an Island Kingdom. Archaeological and Cultural Perspectives, ed. Richard 
Pearson (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2009), pp. 13-39 and 41-55. 
 This implies that 
no single political entity in Ryukyu had achieved a complete monopoly over the flow of 
goods from China, even during and after King Sho Shin’s reign. The omnipotence and 
141 The first explicit royal request for fine silks came from King Sho Hashi in 1426. See Ming 
xuanzong shilu juan 15, p. 414. 
142 Sakamaki Shunzo, “Ryukyu and Southeast Asia”, Journal of Asian Studies 23, 3 (May 1964): 
383-389. 
143 Pearson, “The Chuzan Kingdom of Okinawa as a City-State”, p. 131. Existing evidence reveals 
that some powerful ajis had dispatched trading fleets to China and Southeast Asia. 
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existence of private trade indicates that kingly authority over the native ajis was never 
absolute and that trading activity was a good measurement of Shuri’s reach beyond its 
immediate vicinity. 
Nevertheless, the Ryukyuan king did achieve a complete monopoly over his own 
line: the official tributary flow of goods from the Ming. Depending on his direct relations 
with the Chinese emperor, he could circumvent the Ming maritime ban. The animosity 
between the Ming and the Japanese had also offered Ryukyu a mediating role in East 
Asia.144
It is possible that many ajis and independent merchants had surrendered much 
of their trading authority to the Naha-Shuri complex to reap and share in the profits of 
tributary trade conducted under the auspices of their king. The alliance between the 
king and the ajis was manifested in the king’s dispatch of both royal members and sons 
of ajis to the Ming for them to receive a Confucian education.
 This mixture of factors allowed the kingdom to become a major entrepot both 
between China and Japan, and between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. 
145
                                                            
144 The Ming, instead of dispatching its own emissary, requested the Ryukyu kingdom to convey 
messages to the Japanese on its behalf. See Ming xuanzong shilu juan 86, p. 1991. 
 Small-scale, sporadic 
private trade and smuggling still existed in Ryukyu, but the king could muster adequate 
manpower and resources to engage in tributary relations and trade with the Ming. This 
suggests that the royal monopoly had supplanted private trade and ownership to a large 
extent, and the intellectual and material frameworks of King Sho Shin’s “golden age” 
were already set up in principle during the founding decades of the kingdom. In tandem 
with these developments, the Kumemura residents became the king’s able and trusted 
personnel in diplomatic and trading matters with their administrative and linguistic 
145 Ming taizu shilu juan 217, p. 3198. 
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expertise.146 The emissaries, interpreters, scribes, and traders could sail on Ming ships 
to faraway lands to forge links and trade.147
 
 
In the Name of the Ming Emperor 
Being unable to control direct manpower from localities beyond the reach of 
the Naha-Shuri complex, early Ryukyuan kings were forced to rely on their newfound 
allies of the Ming court and the Kumemura residents to engage in maritime trade, which 
had allowed the ajis to prosper and build their power bases many centuries ago. The 
kings established trade links not only with the Ming, but also Japan, Korea, and several 
polities in modern-day Southeast Asia that were beyond the reach of small Ryukyuan 
ships. Internally, within their means, the kings kept horses and gathered sulphur, and 
they manufactured lacquer utensils and vessels to appeal to the needs and desires of 
the Ming court and elite.148
                                                            
146 As early as the 1370s, the Chinese had served as aides to the Ryukyuan king, with the notable 
example of Cheng Fu 程復. See Ming taizong shilu juan 115, p. 1464. 
 The royal sponsorship of lacquerware production can be 
regarded as an attempt to wrestle from the ajis a greater market share in Ming China. 
Trade in the Ryukyu kingdom was a site of contestation and negotiation between the 
king and other political contenders. From royal perspective, trade legitimated the king, 
providing wealth for royal pomp and consumption. Acquiring and guaranteeing trading 
power were therefore seen as tasks of paramount importance to the Ryukyuan kingship 
from its very inception. 
147 There were several instances of the Ryukyuan king requesting for seagoing vessels from the 
Ming to facilitate the operations of his trading enterprise. See for example Ming xuanzong shilu 
juan 16, p. 431. This is an indication that prior to the start of tributary relations with Ming China, 
the Ryukyu kingdom was unable to build or obtain its own shipping fleets nor actively engage the 
polities beyond the reach of small vessels. 
148 Pearson, “The Chuzan Kingdom of Okinawa as a City-State”, p. 131. 
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It is mentioned in the Lidai baoan that many areas suffered from a “chronic lack 
of virtuous men well-versed in maritime matters and routes.”149 Several polities such as 
Ayutthaya (Siam) and Melaka also appointed Chinese residents for their missions to the 
Ming court.150 The Ming maritime prohibition determined that overseas Chinese could 
only return home to trade and visit without any fear of persecution by means of their 
participation in tributary missions. The employment of Chinese residents in the Ming, 
Ryukyu, and other polities formed such a commonality that the Chinese language was 
intuitively adopted as a medium for communication and trade. In Ryukyu, the Chinese 
were appointed not only as emissaries and interpreters, but also to the high ranks of 
chief minister 摄政/王相 and royal administrator 长史. In contrast to their counterparts 
in the service of other polities, who were often of humble origins,151
Of Ryukyu’s tributary items to the Ming emperor, “only horses, sulphur, salt, 
cowhide, and grindstones were native. As for sappanwood, pepper, and others, they 
were obtained from annual transactions with Siam and Japan.”
 the Chinese in the 
kingdom were often educated in China and better equipped to adopt and explore the 
vernacular of the Ming tributary system. 
152
                                                            
149 Lidai baoan 历代宝案 Vol. 1 juan 39 (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1972), p. 1255. 
 The royal junk trade 
was highly profitable because the king had more or less monopolized the valuable goods 
of sappanwood and pepper, which could fetch high prices in the Chinese market, as well 
as the exclusive links to the Ming emperor and court. Southeast Asian peoples, on the 
other hand, favoured ceramics and porcelain, which were most frequently listed on the 
150 For an excellent account of how and why the Chinese were employed by the rulers of 
“barbarian vassals” in tributary missions to China, see Chan Hok-Lam, “The ‘Chinese Barbarian 
Officials’ in the Foreign Tributary Missions to China during the Ming Dynasty”, Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 88, 3 (July-September 1968): 411-418. 
151 Chan, “The ‘Chinese Barbarian Officials’ in the Foreign Tributary Missions to China during the 
Ming Dynasty”, p. 415. 
152 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, p. 227. 
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Ryukyuan official documents 咨文 addressed to the local rulers.153 The first recorded 
Ryukyuan mission to Siam in 1425 states that Ryukyu “lacks horses and because of this, 
sends the emissary Funagu 浮那姑 on ships loaded with porcelain” to Siam to collect 
and purchase “pepper, sappanwood, and other goods to prepare tributary needs.”154 
Ryukyu did not depend solely on the Ming for its supply of fleets; it had also requested 
the Siamese king to “provide ships to ease the exchange of goods and ensure that its 
embassy can return swiftly with the wind.”155
There were fundamental reasons behind Ryukyu’s success in interacting with 
the Southeast Asian polities, one of which was a common (Chinese) vernacular. The 
Ryukyuan king, in his letters to other kings or polities, adopted the title of “The King of 
Chuzan, Kingdom of Ryukyu” 琉球国中山王 vested on him by the Ming. This rendered 
the king familiarity, legitimacy, and recognition in the eyes of the Southeast Asian rulers, 
many of whom were Ming tributaries themselves. Another was the drafting of official 
documents. These documents were written and modeled after those in the Ming, where 
they were exchanged between government offices of equal rank. 
 From such examples, we could see that 
Ryukyuan and Siamese kings corresponded at a political yet personal manner, acting to 
foster goodwill. The documents that they had exchanged between them were drafted in 
the rhetoric of the Ming tributary system. 
Drafted in classical Chinese, such documents or letters were used for diplomatic 
correspondences with the Ming and other polities. Exchanged between the Ryukyuan 
king and the Southeast Asian rulers, these documents confirmed in writing the identical 
                                                            
153 See for example Ryukyu’s first official document to Melaka in 1463, prior to which Lidai Baoan 
records have been missing for two decades. See Lidai baoan Vol. 1 juan 41, pp. 1303b-1304a. 
154 Lidai baoan Vol. 1 juan 40, p. 1275. 
155 Ibid., p. 1278a. 
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status accorded to them under the Ming tributary system. On the pretext of submitting 
tribute before the “Great Ming Emperor” 大明御前, the Ryukyuan king offered gifts of 
satin and porcelain to other rulers in the hope that these rulers would reciprocate in will 
accordingly and “allow his embassy to obtain pepper, sappanwood, and other goods 
through mutual agreements.”156 A standard Ryukyuan format writes, “The King of 
Chuzan, Kingdom of Ryukyu, with reference to tributary affairs, hereby declares that this 
kingdom has very few items that are appropriate for tribute and for this reason, sends a 
chief emissary on ships loaded with porcelain to your honoured lands to buy pepper, 
sappanwood, and other goods and return with them to the kingdom in preparation of 
the submission of tribute to the Great Ming Emperor”, stressing that “because all men 
from the Four Seas are brothers, we should remain forever on cordial terms.”157 Ming 




Ryukyu among Equals 
While polities in Ryukyu, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam adopted the Chinese model 
of bureaucracy and governance, becoming “Little Chinas” in time, Southeast Asian ones 
                                                            
156 Such address and format is most evident in the Ryukyuan documents that were exchanged 
with Siam during the reigns of the Xuande 宣德 (r. 1425-1435) and Zhengtong 正统 (r. 1435-
1449) emperors. See Lidai baoan Vol. 1 juan 40, pp. 1275-1292. 
157 Ibid., p. 1275. 
158 Hamashita has categorized three different types of documents formulated by Ryukyuan kings 
for foreign correspondence: general certificates for security purposes, certificates with trade 
documents, and regular trade documents. For the purpose of simplification, I classify them under 
the “official documents” category. See Hamashita Takeshi, “Malacca, Ryukyu, and South China 
Relations from the 15th to the 18th Centuries as Observed through Lidai Baoan”, in Ding Choo 
Ming and Ooi Kee Beng, eds., Chinese Studies of the Malay World (Singapore: Eastern University 
Press, 2003), p. 80. 
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remained effectively stateless into the nineteenth century.159 Hamashita observes that 
there also existed several lesser or satellite tributary networks not directly connected 
with China, which had made the system of reciprocal relationships significantly more 
complex.160 However, this observation is not devoid of blind spots, the most significant 
being the primary focus on the Chinese emperor as the basis of all tributary networks, 
both direct and indirect. Ryukyu did not interact only with China and in other relations, 
strictly in terms of Chinese hierarchical decorum. Classical Chinese was the lubricant and 
medium of political exchange in the East Asia during the Ming, but its adoption did not 
necessarily suggest that Ryukyu and other polities had subscribed to a China-centred 
worldview. Anthony Reid has identified “separate worlds of Southeast Asian diplomacy”, 
which along with Hamashita’s argument, may render the analysis of the Ryukyu network 
during the Ming more holistic and comprehensive.161
Chinese emperors had always made paternalistic claims of a Confucian father’s 
love and care for his “less civilized” children who needed to be educated on the proper 
ways of showing deference through rituals and tribute. In 1482, after the Ryukyuan king 
had made repeated appeals to the Ming for the emperor to retract his imperial edict of 
limiting Ryukyuan tributary missions to one every two years and resume the customary 
practice of one annually, the Ming emperor replied that “the court has already decided 
that you should pay tribute only once every two years, and the message has already 
been conveyed to you in my previous edict, so this is final. A minister in the service of 
his lord should obey his commands. Is it appropriate then for him to disobey his lord and 
 
                                                            
159 Tony Day, Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2002). 
160 Hamashita, “The Intra-regional System in East Asia in Modern Times”, p. 120. 
161  Anthony Reid, “Negotiating Asymmetry: Parents, Brothers, Friends and Enemies”, in 
Negotiating Asymmetry, pp. 8-11. 
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cause him disturbance? A son in the service of his father should obey his wishes. Is it 
appropriate then for him to disobey his father repeatedly and force his own wishes 
upon him?”162
However, in the Ryukyuan king’s correspondence with the rulers of Southeast 
Asian polities, it was one between equals, regardless of cultural, economic, or political 
proximity to the Chinese empire. The terms, titles, and tone employed in the official 
documents exchanged were formal and mutually respectful, not condescending nor 
reflective of political hierarchy. As mentioned earlier, these zi wen were also written and 
exchanged between government offices of equal rank in Ming China. Ming emperors on 
their part displayed great benevolence and magnanimity by endorsing the existence of 
such equal relationships. When a Siamese ship en route to Ryukyu was wrecked at sea 
and blown off-course to Fujian in 1404, the Ming emperor quickly decreed that “it is a 
wonderful affair that Siam and Ryukyu forge friendly ties” and commanded the local 
authorities to repair the ship and supply the crew with grain.
 Here the Ming emperor and the Ryukyuan king seemed to have shared a 
father-and-son relationship, as indicated in their written exchanges. The use of the child 
image on the part of the Ryukyuan king played into the expectations of the Ming ruler, 
as it appeared as recognition of weakness, an acceptance of the Chinese ideology, and a 
label of incompleteness and immaturity. 
163
                                                            
162 Ming xianzong shilu 明宪宗实录 juan 226 (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia 
Sinica, 1966) p. 3878. 
 For the Southeast Asian 
rulers, they accepted and reinforced the Chinese imperial perception in terms of a son-
in-law’s appropriate deference to his wife’s father. The favourite explanation of strong 
Chinese influences and infusion of royal blood in Brunei, Bugis, Javanese, Malay, and 
163 Ming taizong shilu juan 34, pp. 598-599. 
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Siamese chronicles narrates a Chinese princess (and hundreds of her retainers) being 
bestowed upon a founding local ruler.164
Ryukyu was neither “Little China” nor “Little Japan”. The importance of both 
China and Japan for Ryukyu cannot be denied, but it should not exhaust the context in 
which Ryukyuan identity was formed. Ryukyu possessed the agency to manage its own 
affairs despite the impact of both on its immediate vicinity. Similarly, Southeast Asian 
polities were neither “Little Chinas” nor “Little Indias”. The Chinese, Indian, or Japanese 
influences on a particular polity or region might have been significant, but emphasis 
should be placed on understanding the extent to which Ryukyu and some Southeast 
Asian polities had adapted to these influences to suit local circumstances. China-centred 
tributary relations did not constitute the entire system of political networks between 
East Asian rulers. The Chinese impact has been overemphasized in scholarship at the 
expense of the attention that should be paid to fundamental similarities and indigenous 
traditions that existed in the societies making up the region, one of which was invariably 
the paradigm of overlapping mandala or circles of kings.
 
165
First introduced by O. W. Wolters, the mandala “represented a particular and 
often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed 
boundaries and where smaller centres tended to look in all directions for security. 
Mandalas would expand and contract in concertina-like fashion. Each one contained 
several tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their vassal status when the 
 
                                                            
164 Anthony Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast 
Asia”, in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), pp. 21-27. 
165 There had been inter-marriages between Southeast Asian ruling families. In fact, for one, the 
Bruneians and the Luzons were so closely related that they were seen as “almost one people”. 
See Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia”, p. 35. 
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opportunity arose and try to build up their own networks of vassals.”166
In Theravada Buddhist polities, the righteous kingship, the universal king or 
cakravatin, was obliged to protect and spread the religion, so upholding the Buddhist 
faith and the quest for supremacy became one and the same mission. This was most 
noticeably observed in Siam, where the “universal king” would defend the weaker kings 
under his protection lest they fell into the domain of evil.
 Kingdoms held 
together so long as personal subordination to the supreme king remained. The king, or 
mandala overlord, possessed the prerogative of receiving tribute-bearing emissaries. He 
would send his own missions to reflect his superior status. The mandala’s resemblance 
to the Chinese tributary order was uncanny. The overlapping characteristic of mandalas 
suggests that any area or polity could be subject to several powers or none, analogous 
to the “satellite tributary networks” of Hamashita’s argument. 
167 Emperor Hongwu of the 
Ming introduced his version of universalism when he proclaimed that “territories are 
one and the same under the great harmony 大同” after his conquest of the Yuan capital 
at Beijing.168
                                                            
166 O. W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Ithaca: Southeast 
Asia Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1999), pp. 27-28. Victor Lieberman 
regards the relationship between the central and local rulers as that of personal subordination 
under the “High King” in Burmese history. See Victor Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: 
Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-1760 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 33-38. 
 Ming (and Chinese) emperors, clad in Confucian dogma, eschewed the idea 
of his tributary children having to embrace “barbaric” ways without his fatherly care. 
The existence of mandalas and “universal kings” exemplifies, however, that the rulers of 
167 See Stanley J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and 
Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976). Tambiah proposes another paradigm called the “galactic polity”, which comprised “circles 
of leaders and followers that form and reform in highly unstable factions”, similar to Wolters’s 
mandala scheme. See also Stanley J. Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 281. 
168 Ming taizu shilu juan 37, pp. 750-751. 
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precolonial Southeast Asia had little to learn from the Chinese on how to project semi-
divine images of themselves. 
In Northeast Asia, Ryukyu mediated Ming-Japan relationships as the Chinese 
emperor, possibly fearing a blatant Japanese rejection and hence a loss of prestige on 
his count, did not send his own emissary to Japan and depended on Ryukyu to convey 
his wish to establish tributary relations.169 There are records of the Muromachi shogun, 
Ashikaga Yoshimochi (r. 1386-1423), sending the Ryukyuan king a letter addressing him 
as “Master of the Ryukyu kingdom” in 1416.170
In many documents of the Lidai Baoan, the Ryukyu king and the ruler of Melaka, 
Siam, or other Southeast Asian polities are seen addressing each other as “Your Royal 
Highness” 殿下, signifying equivalent status between them. These diplomatic exchanges 
demonstrate that even for the Siamese king, for all his Theravada Buddhist conceptions 
of kingship and society and universal pretensions, could accommodate the existence of 
counterparts in his writings and proclamations, acknowledging the existence of multiple 
power centres, and that his hegemony over them was at best idealistic and transient. To 
resolve the ideological conflict between the claim as a “universal king” and the action of 
submitting tribute to China, the Siamese defined “chim kong” (tribute in Thai) as “a visit 
to deliver royal gifts and letters”.
 This implies that the Japanese shogun 
regarded the Ryukyuan king as an equal, and it was reciprocated in kind. 
171
                                                            
169 This occurred in the year 1432. See Ming xuanzong shilu juan 86, p. 1991. 
 This rendition preserved the honour of the Siamese 
170 Majikina Anko眞境名安興 and Shimakura Ryuji島倉龍治, Okinawa issennenshi沖繩一千年
史 (One-Thousand-Year History of Okinawa) (Naha: Ryukyu Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1966), p. 143. 
171 Erika Masuda, “The Fall of Ayutthaya and Siam’s Disrupted Order of Tribute to China (1767-
1782)”, Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4, 2 (2007), p. 117. 
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king without offending the Chinese emperor, both of whom could interpret the act of 
tribute in whatever ways they deemed fit. 
The Ryukyuan king had identified himself as a loyal vassal of the “Great Ming 
Emperor” in the service of tributary trade, adding lustre and familiarity to his newfound 
status. In turn, acting under imperfect knowledge of distant lands, rulers of Siam and 
other Southeast Asian polities saw him as an equal, as a mandala overlord from across 
the seas, in relationships that were independent of the Chinese tributary system. In any 
case, as one scholar puts it, “diplomatic exchanges were seen as a ritual confirmation of 
the existing ties”,172
 
 and equals did exist in Ryukyu’s conceived world. 
The Ryukyu Kingdom in a Sea of Interdependencies 
As myths about the Chinese have suggested, China was known to Southeast 
Asian polities as a distinct but powerful empire, which culture and goods were greatly 
sought after by traders from all over the East Asian region. As the documents of the 
Lidai Baoan have shown, it was Ryukyu which took the initiative to build economic and 
political links with other maritime polities, and the kingdom did so with much gusto and 
consistency.173
                                                            
172 W. J. Boot, “Maxims of Foreign Policy”, in Leonard Blusse and Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, eds., 
Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia (Leiden: Research School of 
Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, 2003), p. 11. 
 The system operated best and thoroughly in the “Little Chinas” of Japan, 
Korea, and Vietnam, while indigenous models and traditions remained very much at 
work in other areas and polities. Even in Vietnam, where the ruler viewed himself as 
173 The Lidai Baoan documents show clearly the trend of Ryukyuan exchanges with other polities: 
the Ryukyuan king would dispatch an emissary to faraway lands and elicit responses from the 
local rulers. The agency rested then with the Ryukyuan king. 
68 
 
being surrounded by tributary “barbarians”, old and native traditions of the newly 
incorporated lands of Champa and Cambodia stood in antagonism against successful 
assimilation into the “civilized” north.174
The role of Ryukyu was most profound during the Ming. Imperial maritime bans 
prevented direct intercourse between the Chinese and other “barbarians” other than 
illicit trade and smuggling. The end of the Ming voyages signaled a dearth of political 
interactions between the Ming and other Southeast Asian polities. Financial constraints, 
Mongol attacks, and political turmoil, among other factors, turned the Ming back on the 
seas. Ryukyu took on the task to actively engage an insular China, linking it with other 
polities, keeping many cultural, economic, and political traditions alive. In the maritime 
zones encompassed by the Ryukyu network, tribute, trade, migration, and the Mazu 妈
祖 belief continued to flourish in the interactions between the Ming and other polities 
into the Qing and after.
 
175
These were, however, zones of multiple political centres. They were centred on 
not only China or “Little Chinas”, but could be seen in the likes of Siam and Melaka, to 
which tribute was paid from afar. Seen in the case of Ryukyu and its external relations, 
Japan and many Southeast Asian polities detached themselves from the China-centred 
tributary system at whim, and they were all political centres possessing the capacity to 
shape change. The ambiguities, distortions, and voids in Southeast Asian sources have 
 
                                                            
174 In precolonial Vietnam, only the bureaucrats, mandarins and other political elites were 
Confucian. The main population remained very aloof of Chinese influences. See Womack, China 
and Vietnam, p. 135. Vietnam often insisted on the same titles as the Ming and Qing emperors. 
See Yu Insun, “Le Van Huu and Ngo Si Lien: A Comparison of Their Perception of Vietnamese 
History”, in Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony Reid, eds., Viet Nam: Borderless Histories (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), pp. 45-71. For similar attempts in Japan, see Toby, State 
and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. 
175 Hamashita, China, East Asia and the Global Economy, pp. 75-78. 
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rendered Chinese accounts important. But the Chinese regarded early Southeast Asian 
polities as unified kingdoms with continuous dynastic lines based on their own historical 
knowledge and experience of kingship and dynastic succession. The Southeast Asian 
rulers whom the Chinese had encountered were mandala overlords whose control over 
subject vassals was never complete. In the Southeast Asian context, kingdoms were not 
territorial constructs. They were demographic, no more than a territorial measurement 
of those people allied to and acknowledging a leader’s authority.176
Just as the Sinocentric or state-centric approach is inappropriate for assessing 
the diplomacy and trade of Ryukyu with other polities, so is the Chinese-Confucian 
cultural zone paradigm. Beneath layers of Chinese-Indian-Japanese influence, smaller 
polities beyond the pale of “civilization” had the ability to either adopt or resist external 
stimuli amid internal developments. Kao Ming-shih has noted that imitators of Chinese 
culture had always been able to improvise on the import and managed simultaneously 
to preserve their own distinctiveness.
 
177 The capacity to do so stemmed from a pool of 
indigenous traditions that would serve to negate any advance of culturalism. To the 
Chinese, culturalism was an assertion that their values were superior but not exclusive, 
as the “barbarians” could acquire these values via education and imitation and hence 
become just as “civilized” as they were.178 In the eyes of visiting Ming emissaries, 
Ryukyu was the epitome of a loyal Confucian vassal to their emperor, because its king 
and people “admire[d] the beauty of Chinese customs”179
                                                            
176 Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 52. 
 and turned the kingdom into 
177 Kao, Tianxia zhixu yu wenhuaquan de tansuo, pp.234-235. 
178 Duara, The Global and Regional in China’s Nation-Formation, p. 101. 
179 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, p. 191. 
70 
 
“a place of civilization and rites”180. However, Ryukyuan kings were never wholesale 
importers of Chinese culture and models. In their diplomatic correspondence with the 
Japanese daimyos and shoguns, the kings adopted the Japanese script (wayo kanbun) as 
the medium of communication.181 Chen Kan observed that in Ryukyu, “noble sons study 
Chinese texts with the brightest of ordinary children. Together, they may become 
interpreters in the future. As for the rest, they learn to write the phonetic script from 
Japanese monks.”182 The Ryukyuans wrote their internal administrative correspondence 
in the kana script, and Chinese characters appear only rarely in these documents.183
But to be sure, the Ryukyuan king’s political legitimacy and trading power were 
bestowed by the Ming through investitures. The Chinese insistence on recognizing one 
ruler per polity culminated to some extent in the Chuzan conquests of Hokuzan and 
Sanzan and Ryukyu’s unification. The ajis were able to secure the supplies of utilitarian 
goods for the localities that they ruled, and maritime trade formed the power base of 
these ajis. Having fully understood the rules of the game, the Chuzan and Ryukyu kings 
identified themselves as the biggest if not the only supplier of foreign goods into the 
kingdom, maintaining the orderliness of their world. They wanted the ajis and their 
subjects to believe that they were the answer to economic prosperity. By paying tribute 
to the Ming emperor and requesting for his emissaries to invest himself with Chinese 
titles on Ryukyuan soil, the king could become the hypothetical focus of all political and 
 The 
Ryukyuans’ usage of their native tongue reveals a degree of cultural independence from 
the Ming after the establishment of tributary relations. 
                                                            
180 Xiao, Shi Liuqiu lu, p. 258. 
181 Thomas Nelson, “Japan in the Life of Early Ryukyu”, Journal of Japanese Studies 32, 2 (2006), 
p. 382. 
182 Chen, Shi Ryukyu roku, pp. 214-215. 
183 Nelson, “Japan in the Life of Early Ryukyu”, p. 382. 
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economic power in the kingdom. The self-appointed destiny of the king appealed to the 
upper echelon of Ryukyuan society, many of whom were recipients of Chinese culture 
and Confucian learning. Due to diplomatic exchanges and maritime trade, Ryukyuan 
kings became subject to new perceptions of the world and aware of new organizational 
possibilities. They were able to procure luxury items and redistribute resources in the 
kingdom, becoming cultural brokers and chief beneficiaries of profits derived from 
maritime trade. The kingship became the source of economic welfare, the creator and 
director of public works financed by commercial profits, and the mediator between his 
subjects and the spirits.184
In a nutshell, Ryukyuan kings depended very much on the alliances and goodwill 
of the ajis in order to rule, and this was most acute before King Sho Shin’s reign. He also 
relied on the aid of the Kumemura residents and sponsored their activities in education, 
officialdom, and trade, as a result of the kingly compulsion to measure up against a 
“civilized” order. Naha became a trading emporium showcasing the best produce of East 
Asia. But Ryukyu did not become “Sinicized” to facilitate trade. The desire to attain and 
maintain political power provided the primary motivation of royal attempts at change. 
Ming influences offered many opportunities for both administrative and technological 
advantages over the ajis and foreign trading competitors. Most importantly, the impact 
of relations with the Ming on the formation of Ryukyuan identity was tremendous. The 
self-perception of the Ryukyuans especially that of their king was affected by contact 
with others and hence exogenous. 
 
                                                            
184 For an elaboration on the Ryukyuan king’s relationships with the female high priestesses and 
the spirits, see Rokkum, Goddesses, Priestesses and Sisters. See also Smits, “Ambiguous 
Boundaries”. By appointing his sister as the high priestess to institutionalize the local onarigami 
belief, King Sho Shin attempted to develop ritual links to subordinate power centres and 
integrate local religious cults into a centralized cult or system. These subordinate centres would 
later imitate the ritual style of Shuri. See Takara, Ryukyu no jidai, pp. 199-224. 
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The Chinese identified Ryukyu primarily as a “civilized” realm worthy of their 
emperor’s benevolence and care. Records on Ryukyu by past Ming emissaries served to 
compound preconceived notions and knowledge of how the kingdom became “civilized” 
after being exposed to Chinese influences. This was, however, a fallacy as archaeological 
findings show that the ajis and gusukus of Ryukyu had been involved in maritime trade 
and susceptible to different influences long before any formal establishment of tributary 
relations with the Ming.185 A thorough study by Xie Bizhen 谢必震has also revealed that 
several Ming emissaries based their records largely on those by their predecessors, most 
notably Chen Kan and Xiao Chongye.186 These Chinese visitors were hence culpable of 
similar charges Edward Said has brought against the “Orientalists”, for reproducing and 
reinforcing the mythical cultural hegemony of China.187 Like what Wang Gungwu has 
commented, the common failing of their works is “the uncritical inclusion of earlier texts 
taken out of context and which were often not consistent with other known writings…… 
most of the writings that were preserved and widely quoted increasingly reflected the 
values of the haughty political culture of a relatively closed civilization.”188
The Ryukyuan kings certainly did not regard themselves only as vassals of the 
Ming emperor. They had stretched their resources effectively enough to reach out to 
 In contrast, 
for the many kings and rulers whom the Ryukyuan missions had encountered, they saw 
the Ryukyuan king as an equal in their diplomatic correspondences with him under the 
rubric of the Ming tributary system, beyond which they could conceptualize, interpret, 
and present the relationship in the more indigenous mandala terms. 
                                                            
185 See Pearson, Okinawa: The Rise of an Island Kingdom. 
186 Xie, Zhongguo yu Liuqiu, p. 24. 
187 See Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003). 
188 Wang Gungwu, “Chinese Political Culture and Scholarship about the Malay World”, in Chinese 
Studies of the Malay World, pp. 16-17. 
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polities across the seas. The tablet inscribed with the words “Awaiting the Bearers of 
Virtue” [待贤] hung over the “Chuzan Gate” of Shuri castle was replaced by that reading 
“Shuri” during King Sho Sei’s 尚清 reign (r. 1527-1555). However, when Ming emissaries 
arrived, the tablet inscribed “The Land where Ritual Propriety is Observed” would be 
hung in its place and removed upon the envoys’ departure.189 This was another instance 
of the Ryukyuan feature of adaptability, and evidence of the kingdom’s success in both 
diplomacy and trade. Before Ming investiture ships could dock at Naha, the Ryukyuans 
would invite the merchants and crews from afar to assemble at the port in the name of 
viewing the spectacle of the arrival of the “Emissary of Heaven” when in reality, engage 
in trade with them.190
 
 Ryukyu, “the Bridge between Myriad Lands”, could finally claim to 
be the centre, one of a sprawling network across much of East Asia. The kingdom was a 
testimony to the increasing connections between distant societies that finally resulted 





                                                            
189 Steben, “The Transmission of Neo-Confucianism to the Ryukyu (Liuqiu) Islands and Its 
Historical Significance”, p. 42. 
190 This was a record of the Ming emissary Guo Rulin 郭汝霖 (1501-1583). See Guo Rulin, Juhen 
shi Ryukyuroku重編使琉球錄 (Ginowan: Yoju Shorin, 2000), pp. 262-263. 
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5. The “Chinese World Order”: A Peripheral Perspective 
 
“The Okinawans are not Japanese.” 
--Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) 
 
Kingship and Sinicization 
For more than four centuries, from 1429 to 1879, Ryukyu was an independent 
kingdom that maintained tributary relations with China and (from 1609 onwards) Japan. 
Most precolonial East Asian societies were relatively state-averse, and identities were 
fashioned by forces other than that of the Weberian bureaucratic state. The first Ming 
investitures marked Ryukyu’s entry into the Sinocentric world. After 1609, Ryukyu owed 
dual submission to both the Ming and the Satsuma-Tokugawa complex, and continued 
to practice such diplomatic flexibility when it established relations with the Qing in 1649 
even though it remained loyal to the Ming until 1663.191 These historical developments 
have rendered the state-based terms of “China” and “Japan” problematic.192
Ryukyu’s rise as an entrepot was a continuation along the lines of past patterns 
of development of the East Asian maritime world, where diplomacy and trade had long 
been conducted before Ming China adopted an unprecedented proactive stance in such 
matters. A thorough understanding of the early Ryukyu kingdom thus involves looking 
 
                                                            
191 See Chang, “Liuqiu qiming touqing de rentong zhuanhuan”. 
192 Eric Hobsbawm considers “any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard 
themselves as members of a ‘nation’” as a national or ethnic group. See E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations 
and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 8. 
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beyond the nation-state as a unit for enquiry. The world-system approach that has been 
popularized by Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank, among others, proposes 
that civilizations and settlements do not exist in isolation but develop in the context of a 
larger system, as part of a region that bears a significant effect on the direction and rate 
of change of component societies within it.193
It would be tempting to suggest, then, that Ryukyu, a small kingdom situated 
near the giant civilizations of China and Japan, had been stagnant in development and 
incapable of change before formal political relations were established with the latter 
two, especially so with China. Several scholars have adroitly argued that Ryukyu owed 
immense cultural debts to the Chinese, but their focus on the process of Chinese impact 
and Ryukyuan response neglects the reverse process of Ryukyuan impact and Chinese 
response. The Ming emperors who interacted with the Ryukyuan kings via their envoys 
often had to accommodate appeals and changes in rituals and terms within the tributary 
framework. Ryukyuan kings did not always welcome unilateral modifications from the 
Ming with regard to diplomatic protocol despite the heavy expenses involved, and they 
were actually more concerned with how the investiture and rituals were conducted than 
the Ming was. The Ming emissaries who arrived in Ryukyu found themselves confronted 
with frustrations and novelties which they could hardly have envisaged beforehand and 
which transformed them into instant foreigners. This conditioned their response to the 
Ryukyuan setting and explained their delight in observing things Chinese. 
 
The Chinese impact-Ryukyuan response approach, analogous to the Fairbankian 
Western impact-Chinese response paradigm, thus oversimplifies matters by assuming 
                                                            
193 See Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, and Frank, ReOrient. 
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that Ming-Ryukyu interactions operated only in one direction in which all traffic flowed 
from China to the kingdom. Apart from the wide assumption of a unidirectional flow of 
influence, the approach also ignores the sometimes enigmatic and contradictory nature 
of “China” itself. The Ming court had intended for its ban to perform with the tributary 
system in prohibiting its subjects from interacting with the non-Chinese peoples, but it 
produced a contrary effect when defiant Fujianese traders continued to trade with the 
Chinese in Japan, Ryukyu, and Southeast Asia. The ensuing conflict between the central 
authorities and the local forces eventually climaxed in the Zhu Wan 朱纨 episode, in 
which the court’s concluding attempts to curb illicit trade and smuggling were met with 
strong opposition and decisively thwarted by powerful Fujianese trading families and 
their political allies, ushering in the ban’s lift in 1567.194
Another problem with the Chinese impact-Ryukyuan response approach is that 
it diverts attention away from aspects of the Ryukyu kingdom that seemed unrelated to 
the Ming impact. Conventional wisdom holds that King Sho Shin’s successful reign was 
built on socio-cultural borrowings from Ming China over a century. The actual story was 
more complex: early kings made excellent use of the opportunity that presented itself 
when the Ming took the initiative to establish relations with them. By seeking privileges 
and protection from the Ming as the only “legitimate” moral polity in the archipelago, 
the Ryukyuan kingship could play the Chinese against the ajis, priestesses, and other 
 Occasional court debates over 
the appropriate treatment of Ryukyu’s appeals for trade and investiture provide another 
example. The Chinese were divided in their attitude towards non-Chinese or Ryukyuan 
societies, and any uniformity that we may perceive is misleading. 
                                                            
194 On the Ming maritime ban and Zhu Wan’s failure at enforcement, see Chen Wen-Shih 陈文石, 
Ming hongwu jiajing jian de haijin zhengce 明洪武嘉靖间的海禁政策 (Taipei: National Taiwan 
University, 1966) and Chang, Chinese Maritime Trade. 
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political opponents to bolster its power. It is always assumed uncritically, however, that 
the Chinese-related features of Ryukyuan history were Ryukyuan responses to Chinese 
influences when they were in actual fact responses to indigenous forces already at work 
before contact. The emergence of the Kumemura community implies that the Chinese in 
Ryukyu could capitalize on existing power relations and see the king as their patron, and 
this perception was reciprocated. With Chinese assistance, Ryukyuan kings functioned 
as intermediary traders between the Ming court and their subjects, supported by ritual 
affirmations in investiture and tribute. 
The fact that Ryukyuan kings needed some kind of ritual affirmation through 
investiture and tribute means that exogenous influences still mattered, and reminds us 
yet again that narrating the history of Ryukyu requires a perspective that is not narrowly 
focused on conjunctures or events that had happened within the political boundaries of 
the state and in Ryukyu’s context, of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture. The Western impact-
Chinese response approach is a product of the modernization theory that emerged and 
gained popularity in American scholarship in the 1950s; the Chinese impact-Ryukyuan 
response approach could be seen as a Chinese variant of the American theory. The 
modernization theory assumes linear history in its examination of “traditional” or “pre-
modern” societies, providing a “reasonable” and intellectual explanation of why these 
societies failed to “develop” or “progress” before the advent of “modernizing” factors 
from “advanced” ones, and how they became “modern” after contact.195
                                                            
195 For a strong critique of the modernization theory, see Dean C. Tipps, “Modernization Theory 
and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective”, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 15 (March 1973): 199-226. 
 In this picture 
of “tradition” and “modernity” as mutually exclusive, wholly incompatible systems, it 
can be justified to perceive, theoretically, China or Ryukyu as barbaric depending on the 
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kind of approach used. Compared to Ryukyu, China was not only civilized, dynamic, and 
capable of self-generated change, but also well-endowed to transform its surrounding 
peoples. The region approach could resolve the radical discontinuity between tradition 
and modernity. By considering Ryukyu as a site where overlapping localizing and cross-
cultural processes had existed, Chinese influences or “Sinicization” could be located in 
the series of historical conjunctures in all their multiple dimensions and variety, rather 
than being regarded as the watershed that divides the “traditional” Ryukyuan society 
from the “modern” kingdom and prefecture. 
 
Cult of the Chinese Emperor 
The functions of the Chinese tributary system rested on the “myth of Chinese 
superiority” which constituted to a rich and elaborate set of cultural assumptions and 
hierarchical decorum that positioned the “civilized” Chinese at the apex of the human 
world.196
                                                            
196 Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay”, in The 
Chinese World Order, pp. 34-62. 
 Ryukyuan kings and other rulers participated in the system by offering tribute 
to the Chinese emperor in their capacity as overlords of their respective domains, and 
the “myth of Chinese superiority” provided a medium through which different overlords 
could announce their participation in Chinese culture even as they prescribed their own 
interpretations of the myth (such as the “Chinese princess” folklore), carrying their own 
versions of mandalas and universalist ideas that were analogous to but not necessarily 
influenced by the Chinese model. In this way, the “cult of the Chinese emperor”, if I may 
call it, was from the Chinese perspective a form of cultural standardization in the foreign 
and physical domain. James L. Watson’s ideas on cultural standardization are useful to 
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our understanding here. Watson uses the case of T’ien Hou 天后 or Mazu 妈祖 to argue 
that the promotion of certain minor deities by the state played a significant role in the 
standardization of Chinese culture across hierarchical and social boundaries. Therefore, 
the elevation of the T’ien Hou cult under imperial patronage was paralleled by a gradual 
rise of state authority over China’s southern coastal region.197
Viewed in this light, the Chinese tributary system, centred on the emperor, was 
a non-coercive measure to exercise subtle control over the political (and to some degree 
religious due to the semi-divine character of the emperorship) lives of tributary peoples 
and achieve unity and integration without the explicit use of military force, although the 
capacity to punish and threaten had always been present. Because the Chinese emperor 
could not hold ecclesiastical authority to enforce ritual conformity in tribute-investiture 
form and had little interest in the everyday governance of tributary rulers, it was natural 
for a state of ritual autarky, alternative orders, and multiple centres to develop. 
 
More central to our discussion of the “Chinese world order” is that the system 
could accommodate the existence of different modes and voices of expression, on the 
condition that the moral authority and supreme leadership of the “Son of Heaven” were 
explicitly acknowledged through prostration and tribute. Watson expands his argument 
by pointing out that in late imperial China officials were “concerned primarily with the 
proper practice of worship, reflected most directly in temple building and festival 
observations. As long as people worshipped in approved temples, they were free to 
                                                            
197 James L. Watson, “Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T’ien Hou (“Empress of Heaven”) 
Along the South China Coast, 960-1960”, in David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. 
Rawski, eds., Popular Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), pp. 292-324. 
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believe anything they wished about the deities housed there.”198 This may explain why 
“satellite tributary relationships”, mandalas, and others could exist at little offense to 
the Chinese emperor. In a close scrutiny and revision of Watson’s ideas, Duara analyzes 
the myth of Guandi 关帝 and introduces the concept of “superscription of symbols” to 
describe cultural standardization by the state, arguing that superscription “implies the 
presence of a lively arena where rival version jostle, negotiate, and compete for 
position.”199
James L. Hevia’s identification of ritual is insightful. He sees it as either symbolic 
or functional, and those who regard ritual as symbolic would concur with Fairbank and 
others that tribute holds little “economic” value for the Chinese and must then have had 
some other meaning in Chinese culture. The functional approach, on the contrary, treats 
ritual as an instrument by which “social and political structures are made legitimate”.
 The “Little Chinas”, through demanding tribute from surrounding polities, 
brought these polities under the Chinese tributary system and indirect recognition of 
Chinese claims to moral-cultural superiority and universalism. This was applicable to the 
mandalas and their tributaries as well. The “myth of Chinese superiority” then assumes 
layered meanings, itself a kind of discourse dominance in East Asian geopolitics. 
200
Ritual then served as an indigenous mode of conceiving and constructing power 
relations. However, Chinese and Ryukyuan studies have been mired by dichotomous 
 
From Ming perspective, investiture and tribute were not aimed at empowering vassals, 
but ensured Chinese control over the appointment of kings. 
                                                            
198 James L. Watson, “Rites or Beliefs? The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial 
China”, in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 80-103; p. 95. 
199 Prasenjit Duara, “Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, the Chinese God of War”, 
Journal of Asian Studies 47, 4 (1988): 778-795; p. 780. 
200 Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 17-18. 
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thinking. The establishment of cosmo-moral dominion from the Chinese and indigenous 
repertoires was not “backward”. In fact, the Chinese “Tianxia” or worldview could still 
serve as a reference for the reconstruction of the contemporary world order at the end 
of the Cold War. The new Chinese world order is not a competition between empires, 
but one founded on the basis of harmonious co-existence analogous to the principles of 
the ancient Chinese tributary system. 201 Diplomacy and trade could be conducted while 
differences were recognized and accommodated.202
Similarly, by representing Ryukyuan culture as a subset of either the Chinese or 
the Japanese, a form of cultural colonialism that subverts the former to master national 
narratives has taken place, with Ryukyu’s distinctiveness being suppressed as “tradition” 
in order to fit into them. Binary divisions (impact/response and tradition/modernity) are 
an imprecise intellectual tool that critical scholarship should dismantle. It is not accurate 
to dismiss non-Western sociopolitical responses as “premodern”. 
 It is thus problematic to contend for 
the transition of the tributary system into a “modern” treaty one, as is narrated in linear 
history, which castigates any social practice that is deemed “premodern”. 
 
Memories of a Kingdom 
Duara finds that the term “identity” has become litigious with developments in 
psycho-analysis, philosophy, and other fields; he refers “identity” to “a subject position 
                                                            
201 See Jiang Ningkang 江宁康, Tianxia yu diguo: Zhongmei minzu zhutixing bijiao yanjiu 天下与
帝国：中美民族主体性比较研究 (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2010), p. 326. 
202 Motegi Toshio茂木敏夫, Henʼyo ̄ suru kindai Higashi Ajia no kokusai chitsujo変容する近代東
アジアの国際秩序 (The Changing International Order of Modern East Asia) (Tokyo: Yamakawa 
Shuppansha, 1997), p. 3. 
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produced by representations in relation to other representations”. 203
Identities were, therefore, unstable and susceptible to splits. To illustrate this 
point, we can turn our gaze to the Ming-Qing transition which is, strictly speaking, 
beyond the scope of my thesis. The “Little Chinas”, as Confucian bureaucratic states, 
could claim a status above that of China based on their perception of the Chinese and 
individual worldviews, made apparent during the Ming-Qing transition when the Choson 
king proclaimed his kingdom the “true” China and the Ryukyuan king decided to switch 
his allegiance to the “barbaric” Manchus, a subaltern group subsumed within the Ming 
bureaucratic apparatus before their China conquest. The multiplicity of worldviews, 
shown in the mandalas and other systems, and shifts of alliances and loyalties suggest 
that the “Chinese world order” was a relational identity, designed to include certain 
groups and exclude the rest. It implies that critical elements abounded in Ming China’s 
tributaries, elements which were resistant to the totalizing ideology of the Chinese 
 The Chinese 
tributary system existed only as one among others and was itself subject to changing 
interpretations and realities. The Ming emperor had identified himself as the “Son of 
Heaven” who ruled “all under Heaven”, attempting to realize this ideal by subsuming 
other identifications and orders. By enforcing the maritime prohibition, he might have 
hoped to prevent his subjects from encountering alternative or contradicting orders, 
reducing the possibility of them realizing the fallacy behind his claim to moral-cultural 
superiority. The Ming rulership was, however, constructed through complex dialogues 
involving substantial claims by its tributaries, claims that the emperor had to address if 
he were to establish himself as a supreme, universal overlord. The rule by the “Chinese 
world order” was constituted neither monolithically nor primordially. 
                                                            
203 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, p. 7. 
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emperor. Current scholarship neglects that alternative identifications, narratives, and 
structures had been obscured and repressed by Chinese textual claims of superiority, 
retaining the mystique of the “Chinese world order” to present. What made the 
“Chinese world order” possible was the tacit agreement between the Chinese and their 
tributaries that it was one. Whether such an order had existed at all is less important 
than the fact that it is believed to have existed. This implicates a significant issue in 
Chinese historiography, where historical materials have prefigured a certain narrative of 
their own. This thesis hopes to have recovered the voices that Ming imperial rhetoric 
had suppressed, using Ming-Ryukyu relations as a prism through which the colourful 
spectrum of diversity and nature of East Asia is explored. 
Despite centuries of socio-cultural borrowings, Ryukyu was neither a passive 
recipient nor a carbon copy of the cultures influencing it, having localized the Chinese 
tributary system in creative synthesis. The various frameworks inherited from the past, 
combined with dynamic opposition to domination by foreign powers, have enabled the 
Ryukyuans and later the Okinawans to overcome many challenges and preserve their 
distinctiveness, resisting the totalizing worldviews of stronger polities. 
In the nationalist histories of China and Japan of past decades, Ryukyu-Okinawa 
appeared marginal or anomalous. Celebrating Ryukyu’s accomplishments as a kingdom, 
this thesis is a study on the bygone kingdom as it is on the Chinese tributary system and 
foreign relations in late imperial China, seeking to understand them from a peripheral 
perspective. The Ryukyu kingdom provides a subtle resistance to Chinese and Japanese 
nationalisms, which both fail to validate its existence within the rhetoric of the nation-
state. This is yet another reminder that group identities are neither fixed nor immutable, 
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akin to Ryukyuan-Okinawan perceptions of themselves and of the region. Memories of 
the old kingdom have not come fully to terms with the expectations and the ideology of 
the Japanese state, and they seem poised to linger for some time to come. 
 
Ryukyu in the Ming World Order 
 Due to the apparent transformation that the Ryukyuan society had undergone 
after formal relations were established with the Ming, especially during King Sho Shin’s 
reign, existing scholarship tends to assume that Ryukyu was incapable of involution and 
internal development, having to subject itself to the cult of the Chinese emperor before 
any meaningful change could occur. As a result, many studies are concerned exclusively 
with administrative and economic systems and have paid scant attention to the material 
and symbolic attributes that came to define the Ryukyuan kingship. Far from being just a 
derivative of the wider process of institutional reformation, diplomatic rituals and trade 
were key elements in the royal project of asserting the kings’ “civilized” status by Ming 
standards and hence their claim to political leadership in the archipelago. 
 What made this Ryukyuan endeavour possible was the presence of the “Chinese 
world order”. The administrative tools by which the Chinese emperor could control his 
tributaries were limited, allowing variations to exist within a ritually centralized but not 
formally bureaucratic set of relationships. From Ming perspective, Ryukyu was a vassal 
listed along with many others to demonstrate the breadth of Chinese influence. From 
Ryukyu’s viewpoint, Ming China was one among many other polities which demanded 
tribute before any ritual-commercial link could be forged. A peripheral perspective from 
Ryukyu of the “Chinese world order” unravels major aspects of autonomy not meant to 
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provide a better interpretation of varying degrees of ritual standardization. It challenges 
the concept of centralization, which in this context is the Sinocentrism of the “Chinese 
world order”, because such a concept assumes the final absorption and standardization 
of peripheral characteristics and hence discards the relevance of the periphery. Ryukyu 
becomes a “centre” itself once historians can identify its links in regional networks. The 
diversity of these networks transgressed Ming-perceived demarcations and reflected a 
multi-layered historical discourse and experience at the periphery. 
 To Ryukyuan kings, the most important ritual of its participation in the Chinese 
tributary system was investiture. Investiture was a public sphere that upheld a collective 
voice outside of the Chinese centre, within which extravagance and pomp preserved the 
autonomy of such a voice. While investiture did create Chinese power, it also authorized 
an alternative centre of a cosmological and ideological state. 
 A representation of the kingship conforming to Ming norms was fashioned and 
promoted after the late fourteenth century. At a period of strong competition for power 
by aji contenders and Japanese ambitions in East Asia, the display of being “civilized” in 
the eyes of the Ming had obviously bolstered the Ryukyuan kingship’s hold onto power. 
Kings could receive the intangible item of legitimacy from the Chinese vis-à-vis private 
consumption and public spectacles, establishing authority over a recently unified realm. 
The intellectual capacity of early Chuzan-Ryukyu kings to appropriate Ming elements of 
culture and governance they perceived as constructive to their political project indicates 
an agency against the idea of Ryukyu as the passive object of Ming imperial domination 
and ideological representation. 
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 This thesis has shed light on how and why the “Chinese world order”, and things 
Chinese, became imperative to the self-representation of the Ryukyuan kings from 1372 
to 1526. Royal identity was imbued with regalia and investitures, which were all part of 
a material culture paid for by profits made from maritime trade. In the “Chinese world 
order”, political legitimacy and economic prosperity were mutually reinforcing, but the 
former took precedence as a prerogative to rule. The ritual empowerment of the kings 
and the items constitutive of high social status possessed the value as visible markers of 
civilization, and material wealth made that even more perceptible. To ease trade, kings 
presented themselves as a “civilized” equal of regional trading partners. The question is: 
how is the empowerment of the Ryukyuan kingship similar to or different from that of 
Annam, Choson, and other “equal” polities? It is beyond the scope of my thesis to tackle 
this question, which I hope would be answered in future studies. 
 The enterprise of the Ryukyuan kings created a cosmopolitan, independent, and 
prosperous kingdom that has become a symbol for remembrance to many Okinawans. It 
is difficult to assess whether these Okinawans could ever reconcile the present with the 
past. As history has shown, however, their ancestors had lacked neither the capacity to 
reinvent themselves nor the resilience to match up against all odds, and they assert the 
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